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The Psychic Costs of Violating
Corruption Laws
Philip M Nichols*
ABSTRACT

Understanding corruption is imperative for legal
scholarship, both as an intellectual subject and because
corruption impedes the operation of law in much of the world
and inflicts damage on well-being, governance, and quality of
life. Legal scholars have contributed substantial quantitative
research on corruption; this paper adopts a qualitative
methodology. The similarities and differences between
Singapore and Malaysia present opportunities for research.
Interviews with discussants in those two countries indicate a
real difference in the degree to which corruption laws have been
internalized.Differences in the degree of internalizationsuggest
differences in the psychic costs imposed by violation of
corruption laws. Discussions also reveal other costs considered
by actors contemplating violation of the laws. Discussions also
indicate that corruption manifests itself differently in each
country, which does not comport with quantitativeanalyses that
treat corruption as a unified, linear phenomenon. Finally,
discussions suggest that corruptioncan be controlled.
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Why is Singapore less corrupt than Malaysia? Singapore and
Malaysia have implemented similar legal regimes to control
corruption, the countries are geographically proximate, and even
share much history. Observers perceive substantially less corruption
in Singapore and Malaysia than in other countries in the region, but
perceive far less in Singapore than in Malaysia. The difference in
corrupt activity compels inquiry into one question: why?
The proximity and similarity in legal regimes is fortuitous for
legal scholars. The answer to the question "why?" cannot be found in
just the words that constitute the laws, because those words are quite
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similar.1 The answer probably cannot be found in the structure of the
agencies tasked with investigations pursuant to those laws because
those, too, have strong similarities. 2 The reasons for the difference in
outcomes must lie elsewhere. Seeking those reasons may cast insights
into effective implementation or administration of law in general and
of corruption regimes in particular.
Inquiry into corruption regimes has both intellectual and
practical merit. Corruption strikes at the very heart of an effective
3
legal and administrative system, but often does so from the shadows.
It exposes tension at the juncture of law, business, government and
civil society. Corruption also constitutes one of the greatest threats to
4
overall improvement in law, economies, and quality of life.
Corruption bedevils Southeast Asia as it bedevils many regions of the
world, and Singapore's and Malaysia's abilities to ameliorate
corruption merit close study to evaluate the exportability of their
5
corruption control programs.
At the global level, scholars have conducted a great deal of
quantitative empirical research on corruption. Researchers have
surveyed attitudes of local persons toward corruption and corruption
regimes in a number of countries and regions 6 and even in discrete

1.
See infra notes 166, 191 and accompanying text.
2.
See infra notes 170-90, 194-207 and accompanying text.
3.
See Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the
Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109, 145 (2008)
("[Clorruption operates for the most part in secret.").
4.
In the foreword to a publication that outlines empirical support for this
proposition, then World Bank President James Wolfensohn summarized: "The
international community simply must deal with the cancer of corruption, because it is
a major barrier to sustainable and equitable development." James D. Wolfensohn,
Foreword to THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE
OF THE WORLD BANK (1997); see Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs,
Retooling Law Enforcement to Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key
CriminalProcedureReforms for Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 183,
190-92 & n.19 (2008) (reporting research that demonstrates the "devastating effects of
corruption on economics, political stability, and human rights" and providing a list of
international bodies that have concluded that corruption impedes development).
5.
See Simon S. C. Tay & Maria Seda, The Enemy Within: Combating
Corruption in Asia, in THE ENEMY WITHIN: COMBATING CORRUPTION IN ASIA 1, 23

(Simon S. C. Tay & Maria Seda eds., 2003) (suggesting that Singapore's success in
controlling corruption provides insights for the successful implementation of other
corruption regimes); see also Anthony B. L. Cheung & Ian Scott, Governance and
Public Sector Reform in Asia: Paradigms, Paradoxes and Dilemmas, in GOVERNANCE
AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN ASIA: PARADIGMS, PARADOXES AND DILEMMAS 1, 1
(Anthony B. L. Cheung & Ian Scott eds., 2003) (discussing the tremendous appetite for
bureaucratic reform in Asia); Simon S. C. Tay, Corruption After the Crisis: Governance,
Asian Values and International Instruments, in THE ENEMY WITHIN: COMBATING
CORRUPTION IN ASIA, supra, at 37, 37 (reporting that concern about corruption is "close
to the very top of the agenda" in Asia).
6.
See, e.g., SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE
STUDY OF SIERRA LEONE (1995); LATIN AMERICAN CORRUPTION SURVEY (2008), available
at
http://www.millerchevalier.com/portalresource/2008LatinCorruptionSurveyReport;
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business sectors. 7 Financial institutions such as the World Bank
attempt to measure the costs of corruption in monetary terms.8 Legal
scholars attempt to quantify the effect of corruption on other
relationships, such as settlement of conflicts 9 or human rights, 10 or
the effect of base legal systems on corruption. 11 Economists and
others attempt to quantify the impact of corruption on other
phenomena, such as direct foreign investment 12 or currency exchange
13
rates.
The Asian Development Bank points out, however, that while
useful "[n]o one instrument or method can provide a complete picture.
Each survey tool has its utility and its limitations."'1 4 A thorough
understanding of the implementation of corruption laws requires
more than surveys and quantitative analyses.
The research described in this paper attempts to provide another
perspective on corruption regimes. This research undertakes a
qualitative rather than quantitative evaluation. The author of this
paper discussed corruption with government officials, businesspeople,

MARIA SHKARATAN, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: DIAGNOSTIC SURVEYS OF
(2001),
available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/
CORRUPTION
anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf; WORLD BANK, DIAGNOSTIC SURVEYS OF
CORRUPTION IN ROMANIA (2001), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
publicsector/anticorrupt/romenglish.pdf; Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes
to the Global Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in
Kazakhstan, 22 U. PENN. J. INT'L ECON. L. 863 (2001); Philip M. Nichols, George J.
Siedel & Matthew Kasdin, Corruption as a Pan-CulturalPhenomenon: An Empirical
Study in Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J.
215 (2004).
7.
See, e.g., THE CHARTERED INST. OF BLDG., CORRUPTION IN THE UK
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: SURVEY 2006 (2006), available at http://www.ciob.org.uk/
sites/ciob.org.uk/files/WEB-INF/files/documents/CIOBCorruption.pdf.
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING
8.
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
externaldefaultWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB2000/12/13/000094946_9909231233424/
Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
9.
See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation
in Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 394-98 (2002)
(comparing data from the Corruption Perceptions Index to other data to determine
correlation between corruption and frequency of peaceful settlement of conflicts).
10.
See, e.g., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change of the Illusion of Change: The War
Against Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 697, 743 (2006)
(correlating data on corruption with reputations on human rights).
11.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory
of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 110-11 (2007) (finding "that
corruption is significantly lower where a common law system is in place").
12.
See, e.g., Paolo Mauro, Corruptionand Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995).
13.
See, e.g., Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee & Abm Nasir, Corruption, Law and
Order, Bureaucracy, and Real Exchange Rates, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
1021 (2002).
14.
ASIAN DEV. BANK & ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ANTICORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 106 (2007).
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and members of civic organizations in Singapore and Malaysia. 15
Individual discussions do not produce the amount or type of data
needed for quantitative treatment of a subject; qualitative treatment
can, however, reveal relationships and attitudes not discerned
16
through quantitative measures.
In this instance, discussions in Singapore and Malaysia reveal a
subtle but stark difference. Singaporean discussants exhibit a
viscerally negative reaction to corruption, whereas Malaysian
discussants exhibit thoughtful negativity. 17 This difference may be
attributable to the extent to which members of each group have
internalized corruption laws. Internalization of corruption laws, in
turn, may increase the psychic costs calculated by an actor
contemplating violation of those laws, which would decrease the
8
frequency of violation.'
If actors do evaluate the potential benefits and costs of violating
corruption laws, then psychic costs are not the only costs taken into
consideration. Actors will also take measure of potential social costs
and of the likelihood of detection and prosecution in the criminal
system. Discussions of corruption in Singapore and Malaysia reveal
differences with respect to each of these potential costs as well. 19
These discussions also challenge fundamental assumptions often
made about corruption scholarship and corruption regimes. First, the
variety of interactions discussants have with corruption call into
question the lack of distinctions among types of or experiences with
corruption when corruption is evaluated through quantitative
measures-measures used extensively in legal scholarship.2 0 Second,
these discussions, particularly with Singaporean discussants,
21
disaffirm the notion that corruption cannot be controlled.
Before arriving at that happy conclusion, this paper first
examines the extent to which corruption actually constitutes a
serious problem. It does so by focusing on Singapore and Malaysia as
situated within Southeast Asia.

15.
Not all discussants were initially aware of the interviewer's interest in
corruption, but all were assured that the conversation would be held in complete
confidence. All discussants were eventually told of the purpose of the research and that
an explication of the results would be made public; each was also assured that when
made public explication of the discussions would contain no identifying information.
Methodology is described infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
16.
See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
17.
See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
18.
See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
19.
See infra notes 272-302 and accompanying text.
20.
See infra notes 312-42 and accompanying text.
21.
See infra notes 343-60 and accompanying text.
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I. CORRUPTION PRESENTS SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Singapore's and Malaysia's integrity diverge markedly from
other countries in the region. Corruption pervades Southeast Asia
and imposes critical difficulties on the region. 22 Indeed, Tran Duc
Luong, former President of Viet Nam, despaired that "Corruption is
'23
taking place every day and every hour, at all places, all the time.
No region of the world has escaped the "eruption of corruption"
described by Mois6s Naim to have taken place over the last few
decades. 24 The extreme differences in Southeast Asia, however,
present interesting possibilities for study.
A. Endemic Corruption
Corruption escapes easy measure; most scholars turn to
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for an
indication of the amount of corruption in a particular country or
region. 25 This paper starts with the Corruption Perceptions Index
scores for Southeast Asian countries, but corroborates Transparency
International's scores by turning also to the Opacity Index and the
Global Competitiveness Index.
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index uses
logarithms developed by Johann Lambsdorff to produce a score based
on several disparate sources of information about corruption. 26 A
score of ten would indicate a perception that no corruption occurs

22.
See William Case, PoliticalMistrust in Southeast Asia, 4 COMP. Soc. 81, 82
(2005) ("This is a region characterised by divided societies, emerging economies,
sprawling and ramshackle, but intrusive state apparatuses, and hybrid forms of
pseudo-, semi-, and low-quality democracy... Political parties, state bureaucracies,
legislatures, and security forces are widely dismissed as corrupt and inefficient.");
Richard Falk, Book Review, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 582 (1998) (discussing a "haze" of
corruption over Southeast Asia).
23.
JON
S.T. QUAH,
NATIONAL INTEGRITY
SYSTEM: TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL OVERVIEW REPORT: EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 2006, at 8
(2007) (quoting Tran Duc Luong).
24.
See Mois~s Naim, CorruptionEruption, 2 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 245, 24547 (1995) (describing the increase in perceived corruption around the world).
25.
See Sara Sun Beale, Governmental and Academic Integrity at Home and
Abroad, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 414 (2003) (discussing the "incredibly interesting'
Corruption Perceptions Index); Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption
Efforts Paying Off? International and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region
and Their Impact on India and MultinationalCorporations,31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 70
(2008) (describing the Corruption Perceptions Index as a "particularly relevant"
measure of corruption).
26.
These evaluations include surveys, political risk assessments, and country
competitiveness rankings. Johann Lambsdorff explains and defends the index in
JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, How PRECISE ARE PERCEIVED LEVELS OF CORRUPTION?
(2001).
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within the country, a score of zero would indicate absolute 27corruption,
and a score of three or less suggests "rampant" corruption.
Singapore scores 9.3 on this scale. 28 This score places Singapore
third among the countries evaluated, behind only Denmark and New
Zealand.2 9 Singapore effectively is among those countries with the
least amount of perceived corruption in the world.30 Within Southeast
Asia, Malaysia has the second-highest score at 4.4.31 This score ranks
fifty-sixth among the one hundred and seventy-eight countries
evaluated. 3 2 Southeast Asian scores fall precipitously from that point.
Table 133

CPI scores for Southeast Asian countries
Rank
Score
Country
3
9.3
Singapore
56
4.4
Malaysia
78
3.5
China
78
3.5
Thailand
110
2.8
Indonesia
116
2.7
Viet Nam
134
2.4
Philippines
154
2.1
Cambodia
154
2.1
Laos
176
1.4
Burma
Indexes that do not focus exclusively on corruption corroborate
the Corruption Perceptions Index's bleak portrayal of Southeast Asia.
34
The Opacity Index, developed by Joel Kurtzman and Glenn Yago,
"draws upon 65 objective variables from 41 sources" in order to
compile comparable data on the level of opacity in numerous

See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the
27.
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, 101 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (2007) (explaining scores).
28.
Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
(last
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
visited Dec. 26, 2011).
Id.
29.
See John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War
30.
Puzzle, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 341, 350 (2004) (discussing Singapore's unusual status as one
of the least corrupt countries in the world).
31.
CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2010 Results, supra note 28.
See Mathews Thomas, Is Malaysia's MyKad the "One Card to Rule Them
32.
All"? The Urgent Need to Develop a Proper Legal Framework for the Protection of
Personal Information in Malaysia, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 474, 488-89 (2004) (discussing

Malaysia's score and levels of corruption in the country).
33.
CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2010 Results, supra note 28.
JOEL KURTZMAN & GLENN YAGO, GLOBAL EDGE: USING THE OPACITY INDEX
34.
TO MANAGE THE RISKS OF CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS (2007).
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countries.3 5 Kurtzman and Yago define opacity as a "lack of clear,
accurate, formal, clear-cut, and widely accepted practices in the broad
arena where business, finance, and government meet. ' '3 6 The score
assigned to each country in the Opacity Index is a simple average of
scores on five sub-indices, the first of which is corruption.3 7 Thus, the
Opacity Index provides a separate score for corruption in each
evaluated country. 38 Legal and other scholars use the Opacity Index
as a source of quantitative data for the purpose of comparing
39
countries.
Although not all Southeast Asian countries are included in the
Opacity Index, the index corroborates the picture of Southeast Asia
painted by the Corruption Perceptions Index. In the Opacity Index a
high score indicates high levels of corruption and of opacity; unlike
the Corruption Perceptions Index, low scores are preferable.
Singapore once again ranks among the least corrupt and least opaque
of the countries evaluated, while other Southeast Asian countries
40
rank among the most opaque of the forty-eight countries evaluated.

35.
Joel Kurtzman, Glenn Yago & Triphon Phumiwasana, The Global Cost of
Opacity, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 2004, at 3, 10.
36.
KURTZMAN & YAGO, supra note 34, at xiii.
Id. at 62. Kurtzman and Yago define corruption as "the abuse of entrusted
37.
power for private gain." Id.
The corruption sub-index evaluates not only the frequency of corruption but
38.
also the degree to which corruption is predictable or arbitrary. Id. at 62-68. Corruption
scholars strenuously debate the effects of the arbitrariness or predictability of
corruption. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, for example, argues that while all types of
corruption have a negative influence on foreign investment, investors prefer the
uncertainty of arbitrary corruption. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Better the Devil You Don't
Know: Types of Corruptionand FDI in Transition Economies, 14 J. INT'L MGMT. 12, 2425 (2008). Edgardo Campos, Donald Lien, and Sanjay Pradhan, on the other hand,
suggest that while all forms of corruption have a negative effect on foreign investment
predictable corruption has less of a negative effect. J. Edgardo Campos, Donald Lien &
Sanjay Pradhan, Impact of Corruptionon Investment: PredictabilityMatters, 27 WORLD
DEV. 1059, 1065 (1999).
39.
See, e.g., Raquel Fonseca, Pierre-Carl Michaud & Thepthida Sopraseuth,
The Economics of Entrepreneurship:Entrepreneurship,Wealth, Liquidity Constraints,
and Start-Up Costs, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 637, 646 (2007) (using the Opacity
Index to compare countries); Vince Hooper & Suk-Joong Kim, The Determinants of
Capital Inflows: Does Opacity of Recipient Country Explain the Flows?, 31 ECON.
SYSTEMS 35, 35-36 (2007) (discussing effect of the Opacity Index on foreign capital
investments); see also Jerry Ellig & Houman B. Shadab, Talking the Talk, or Walking
the Walk? Outcome-Based Regulation of TransnationalInvestment, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 265, 306-07 (2009) (recognizing the Opacity Index as a mechanism "to easily
compare the relative transparency of numerous different regimes").
JOEL KURTZMAN & GLENN YAGO, OPACITY INDEX 2009: MEASURING GLOBAL
40.
RISK 2-4 (2009), available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/InstituteOpacity
IndexApr8.pdf.
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Table

241

Opacity Index scores for Southeast Asian countries
Opacity
Opacity
Corruption
Rank
Score
Score
Country
3
14
14
Singapore
27
32
47
Malaysia
35
49
40
Indonesia
38
57
42
China
33
61
37
Thailand
45
44
Philippines
66
The World Economic Forum, assembled as perhaps the largest
nongovernment organization of business leaders and operating as a
42
forum for world leaders in civil society, business and government,
promulgates the Global Competitiveness Index. The Global
Competitiveness Index rates the business environment of countries,
using surveys to evaluate those countries on twelve separate
characteristics. 4 3 The Global Competiveness Index is widely used to
compare countries, as are the evaluations of the twelve
characteristics that make up the index.4 4 "Institutions" constitute one
of those characteristics, and the level of corruption plays a role in the
evaluation of the strength and viability of institutions. 4 5 The

41.
Id.
42.
See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under InternationalLaw, 10
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 408 (2000) (noting that the World Economic Forum
constitutes "the largest international organization of business executives"); About Us:
Leadership Team, WORLD ECON. FORUM, http://www.weforum.org/contentfleadershipteam (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) ("The World Economic Forum is an independent
international organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging
leaders in partnerships to shape global, regional and industry agendas. Incorporated as
a not-for-profit foundation in 1971, and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the
Forum is tied to no political, partisan or national interests.").
See XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 201043.
2011, at 4 (2010) (defining "competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and
factors that determine the level of productivity of a country").
44.
See, e.g., Thomas D. Hopkins, An Assessment of Cross-National Regulatory
Burden Comparisons, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1139, 1146-47 (2006) (describing the
Global Competiveness Index and using it and components of it to compare countries);
Nurhan Sural, Wrongful Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: Economic
Implications of Employment Protection Legislation in Turkey: Has Turkey Found Its
Juste Milieu?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 335, 367 (2009) (describing and using the
Global Competitiveness Index and components).
45.

See SALA-I-MARTIN, supra note 43, at 4 (stating that the evaluation of

institutions includes "the legal and administrative framework" and "excessive
bureaucracy and red tape, overregulation, corruption, dishonesty in dealing with public
contracts, lack of transparency and trustworthiness, and the political dependence of
the judicial system").
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"Institutions" component of the Global Competitiveness Index,
therefore, provides indirect quantitative data on relative levels of
corruption.
46
The Global Competitiveness Index evaluates 139 countries. Of
those countries, Singapore ranks first with respect to the strength of
its institutions. 47 The remainder of Southeast Asian countries fare
much worse. 48 The Global Competitiveness Index, therefore, suggests
that Southeast Asian countries other than Singapore generally
possess weak institutions and indirectly suggests that corruption
plays a significant role in that weakness.
Table 349
GCI Institution scores for Southeast Asian countries
Overall
Country
Score
Institution Rank
Singapore
6.13
1
Malaysia
4.62
42
49
4.37
China
Indonesia
3.98
61
Thailand
3.95
64
3.80
74
Viet Nam
94
3.56
Cambodia
Philippines
3.14
125
Quantitative data from Southeast Asia consistently supports the
same interpretation. Singapore possesses one of the least corrupt
governments in the world. The Malaysian government manages
corruption, but corruption still manifests itself to an extensive degree.
In other Southeast Asian countries, corruption appears endemic. As
countries that differ from the norm, but differ to different degrees,
Singapore and Malaysia beg for closer examination.
Singapore, Malaysia, and Southeast Asia also represent a
microcosm of the entire world. Throughout the world, a handful of
countries avoid corruption almost completely. Of the 178 countries
evaluated by Transparency International, for example, only thirteen
have scores greater than 8.0 and only twenty-five have scores greater
than 6.5.50 A greater number enjoy modest success in controlling
51
corruption. A dozen countries have scores in the range of Malaysia.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Klaus Schwab, Preface to SALI-I-MARTIN, supra note 43, at xi.
SALA-I-MARTIN, supra note 43, at 14.
Id. at 15-16, 18-19.
Id.
CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2010 Results, supranote 28.
Id. This includes countries with scores ranging from 4.3 to 4.7
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One hundred and thirty-three countries score 5.0 or less; 5 2 of those
countries, seventy-four score below 3.0, indicating a perception of
endemic corruption. 53 According to this data, in Southeast Asia more
than 500 million people live under conditions of endemic corruption,
and around the world more than two and a 54quarter billion people live
in polities that endure rampant corruption.
B. CorruptionInflicts SubstantialDamage
To say that corruption exists in Southeast Asia, and throughout
the world, does not, however, fully explain the necessity of its study
by legal scholars. Corruption is deeply fascinating as an intellectual
subject that brings together concepts of law, morality, economics,
effective governance, and social structure. More importantly,
however, corruption as a real phenomenon directly affects the lives
and well-being of billions of people and thousands of organizations.
Southeast Asia is more dynamic than many other parts of the
world. 55 Southeast Asia, however, faces substantial challenges. These
challenges include weak governments that make poor decisions
regarding infrastructure and other allocations of the public fisc;
economic fragility; a profound disconnection between those
governments and the people who constitute the countries of the
region-particularly manifested by abuses of the basic rights of those
peoples; and endemic poverty and poor standards of living. 56 Each of
these challenges is directly related to, if not in fact caused by,

Id.
52.
Id.
53.
These numbers are based on countries that receive a score of 3.0 or lower
54.
on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 28, and
population estimates in the World Factbook. The precise number in Southeast Asia is
513,175,103 and around the world is 2,269,722,702. The World Factbook, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-worldfactbook/
index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
See Neil Renwick, Millennium Development Goal 1: Poverty, Hunger and
55.
Decent Work in Southeast Asia, 32 THIRD WORLD Q. 65, 66-67 (2011) (describing
dynamic economies of Southeast Asia).
See George Abonyi & David M. Van Slyke, Governing on the Edges:
56.
Globalization of Productionand the Challenge to Public Administration in the TwentyFirst Century, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1, 2-3 (Supp. 2010) (describing particular
challenges for Southeast Asian governments under conditions of globalization); Lee
Jones, ASEAN's Unchanged Melody? The Theory and Practice of "Non-Interference" in
Southeast Asia, 23 PAC. REV. 479 (2010) (describing dysfunctional governments in
Southeast Asia); Hao Duy Phan, Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights in
Southeast Asia: A Survey Report, 31 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA: J. INT'L & STRATEGIC
AFF. 468, 490 (2009) (describing a survey in which 100 percent of respondents in
Southeast Asia agreed that greatest obstacle to human rights agencies supported by
the populations is a lack of political will and potential interference from various
government agencies, particularly the military); Renwick, supra note 55, at 85
(concluding that notwithstanding economic growth, Southeast Asia faces substantial
challenges including poverty, lack of empowerment and poor governance).
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corruption. The effects of corruption in Southeast Asia illustrate the
damage inflicted by corruption everywhere that it occurs.
1.

Weak Governments that Make Poor Decisions

Corruption is not a matter of some otherwise competent,
underpaid bureaucrats "getting their share." Corruption substantially
weakens governments, and distorts . the process by which
governments make decisions.
a.

Corruption Affects the Composition of Decision Makers

The sale of public office (through bribery) to unqualified persons
who seek office for the purpose of extracting bribes from others has a
long history.5 7 Wherever it occurs, the payment of bribes to secure
positions leads directly to
various forms of contract kickbacks, payment from staff in exchange for
positions and hiring on projects, loan accounts structured to earn
interest by the agency, provision of ghost services, inflated invoicing in
collusion with contractors, procedures for tax avoidance, irregular
payments for health and education services, bribes to police officers and
58
judges, and speed money to obtain formal papers and permits.

Corruption clearly eviscerates the capacity of legal regimes to
operate. In general, corruption significantly diminishes the quality of
the pool of public decision makers. 59 In endemically corrupt systems,
decisions regarding the appointment of public servants are no less
affected by corruption than any other type of decision. Applicants
secure government appointment by paying bribes to those who
approve appointments or hires. 60 When supervisors appoint
candidates to positions on the basis of the quality of bribes paid by
applicants rather than the actual qualifications of those applicants,

57.
Stein Kristiansen & Muhid Ramli, Buying an Income: The Market for Civil
Service Positions in Indonesia, 28 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA: J. INT'L & STRATEGIC
AFF. 207, 209 (2006); see David S. Jones, Curbing Corruption in Government
Procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Constraints, 17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 145,
148 (2009) (discussing crony politics in Southeast Asia).
58.
Kristiansen & Ramli, supra note 57, at 218.
59.
See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt
Government, with Special Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT'L
REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 47, 56-57 (1975) (describing many ways in which sale of office
degrades the pool of decision makers).
60.
Ajit Mishra, Persistence of Corruption:Some Theoretical Perspectives, 34
WORLD DEV. 349, 350 (2005) (stating that corruption affects decisions about
appointments and noting that "pervasiveness of corruption contributes to its
persistence in a significant way").
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those appointed will possess skills at producing bribes but not
61
necessarily any other skills.
Those applicants who pay bribes to secure a government position
need to recoup their investments. The bribe paid often exceeds the
salary secured. 62 Receipt of bribes constitutes the most reliable
means of recovering the initial investment as well as profiting from
that investment.6 3 Thus, in systems in which persons pay bribes to
obtain government jobs, government officials almost by definition
lack appropriate skills to make good decisions and have a strong
incentive to make those decisions for their own benefit rather than in
64
the interest of the public.
b.

Corruption Distorts the Decision-Making Process

The very definition of corruption describes the manner in which
bribery distorts discrete decisions. Using the most common definition,
public sector corruption consists of the use or misuse of public office
or trust for personal, rather than public benefit.6 5 Instead of making
a decision for public benefit, a corrupt public servant makes a
decision that inures to his or her own benefit.
David Jones studied the effects of corruption on public
procurement in Southeast Asia. He concludes that
In most of the states of Southeast Asia, corruption within government
administration has particularly affected the public procurement of
goods, services and public works. This has in turn undermined the
standard of public services and the quality of large public works or
infrastructure projects. The upshot has been to defeat the normal

61.
Thomas B. Pepinsky, Malaysia: Turnover Without Change, 18 J.
DEMOCRACY 113, 116 (2007) (noting that people spend vast sums of money to secure
government positions for the sole purpose of extracting bribes); Vito Tanzi, Corruption,
Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1995, at 24, 26 (observing that
people will seek jobs that pay good bribes rather than jobs for which they are qualified).
62.
See Kristiansen & Ramli, supra note 57, at 221 (reporting that in Indonesia
"[t]he amount needed to buy a position is thus approximately two-and-half years' full
salary").
63.
Robert Wade observed this phenomenon while studying irrigation systems
in South India. Robert Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not
Better at Development, 13 WORLD DEV. 467, 474-80 (1985) (describing the sale of offices
in a south Indian state).
64.
See Koenrad Wolfer Swart, The Sale of Public Offices, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT 95, 102 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael
Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2001) (describing this as "undemocratic").
65.
See J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 417, 419 & n.10 (1967) ("Corruption is behavior which
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal,
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence."); see also Patrick X. Delaney,
TransnationalCorruption:Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 413, 417 (2007)
(describing Nye's "classic" definition as "a useful starting point" when studying
corruption).
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objectives of procurement policy, viz. providing well-resourced public
services and a high quality infrastructure, ensuring value for money,
avoiding financial waste, and promoting equal and fair access for
66
suppliers/contractors.

Poor decision making and misallocation are hallmarks of corrupt
governments throughout the world. 67 When a responsible decision
maker makes decisions for the benefit of society, that public official
will take into consideration factors such as costs associated with a
decision (both direct and indirect), the appropriateness of an action,
and quality of results-the same types of factors that determine
68
hypothetical indifference curves in economic analyses of markets.
Indeed, the social benefit of markets is in part predicated on the
notion that rational consumers (in this case government officials
making decisions for the benefit of the public) will reward producers
who most effectively use resources to produce appropriate goods or
69
services of the desired quality at an acceptable price.

66.
David S. Jones, Curbing Corruption in Government Procurement in
Southeast Asia: Challenges and Constraints, 17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 145, 146 (2009).
67.
See Odysseas Katsaitis & Dimitris Doulos, The Impact of EU Structural
Funds on FDI, 62 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 563, 571 (2009) (extensively
evaluating the effect of corruption on European Union aid from its Structural Fund and
concluding that corruption is so distortive to decisions regarding that aid that
endemically corrupt countries are actually worse off after receiving it).
68.
See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of
Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432, 1438 (1985) (explaining indifference curves); Jill E.
Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by
Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 685 (2002) (describing the manner in which clients
make decisions on basis of quality and price); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the
Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 547 & n.229
(1998) (describing indifference curves). This paper does not intend to reduce complex
economic insights into single sentences; even the mechanism by which consumers
evaluate and compare the qualities of goods and services has generated complex
theories. See, e.g., Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, The Pure CharacteristicsDemand
Model, 48 INT'L ECON. REV. 1193, 1193-94 (2007) (using "[riecent advances in
econometric technique, computing power, and data availability" to develop a model that
"consider[s] estimation of a class of discrete choice models in which consumers care
about a finite set of product characteristics"). Moreover, the traditional neoclassical
conception of a rational consumer interested only in quality and price must be
tempered with an understanding of the actual operation of the human mind. See
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-81 (1998) (discussing bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest as factors that also affect decision
making). For purposes of comparing responsible and corrupt decision makers, however,
a straightforward analysis provides sufficient insight.
69.
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Autonomy: How the Two-Party System
Harms the Major Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 763 (2000) (analyzing democracy
within the framework of a market economy). Again, the actual means by and extent to
which this occurs engenders extensive debate. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Voice, Not
Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 292 (1991) (discussing application of market theory to the
allocation of education). Once again, the straightforward premise suffices for purposes
of illustrating the effects of corruption.
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A corrupt decision maker, however, uses public office for
personal rather than public benefit. Rather than evaluating factors
such as costs, appropriateness, and quality, the corrupt decision
maker evaluates the quality of the bribe. 70 The fact that the object of
the decision may be of low quality does not matter to the decision
maker. 71 Indeed, a pernicious effect of endemic bribery is that by
rewarding those who produce high quality bribes rather than high
quality products, it encourages "rational" producers to allocate
72
resources to bribes rather than the goods or services themselves.
Singular examples of the damage caused by this distorted
decision-making process abound. 73 Unnecessary and poorly conceived
construction projects litter emerging economies, the products of
corrupt construction contract awards. 74 People sicken or die after
consuming tainted products, released for consumption when
inspectors approved the product on the basis of bribes rather than
actual efficacy. 75 Houses and shopping centers collapse, crushing
those inside, when building inspectors certify a building on the basis
76
of the bribe paid rather than actual compliance with building codes.
Each of these poor-and harmful-decisions resulted from a process
that valued personal gain rather than public interest.

70.
See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983) ("[B]ribery... necessarily
hinders the operation of this basic tenet by distorting the relationships between price
and quality.").
71.

Id.

72.
See A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus & Michael Lusztig, Corruption,
Democracy, and Economic Growth, 27 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 121, 123 ("[P]olicymakers
may promote initiatives ... not to satisfy social need, but because such projects
increase opportunities for bribes."); Ren6 V6ron et al., Decentralized Corruption of
Corrupt Decentralization? Community Monitoring of Poverty-Alleviation Schemes in
Eastern India, 34 WORLD DEV. 1922, 1925 (2006) (warning of "less effective and less
well targeted" decisions).
Alvaro Escribano, J. Luis Guasch, Manuel de Orte & Jorge Pena,
73.
Investment Climate Assessment in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand:
Results from PoolingFirm-Level Data, 54 SING. ECON. REV. 335, 357 (2009) (discussing
relationship between corruption and numerous ills throughout Southeast Asia).
74.
Charles Kenny, Transport Construction, Corruption and Developing
Countries, 29 TRANSPORT REVIEWS 21 (2009) (discussing infrastructure problems
created by corruption).
75.
See David Bandurski, Jousting with China's Monsters, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 2009, at 46, 46-50 (discussing deaths due to foods approved by corrupt
inspectors); E. Y. Y. Chan, S. M. Griffiths & C. W. Chan, Public-Health Risks of
Melamine in Milk Products, 372 LANCET 1444, 1444-45 (2008) (discussing health
concerns raised by the payment of bribes to regulators).
76.
David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled
Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 612
(2000) ("In China, the state bank financed projects designed to improve the
infrastructure and boost the economy, but the projects were so riddled with corruption
that bridges, buildings, dikes, roads, and other works collapsed almost as soon as they
were completed, killing and injuring hundreds of people.").
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Corruption Causes Economic Fragility

Southeast Asia is an economically dynamic region. 77 It may seem
counterintuitive, therefore, to suggest that its corruption contributes
to economic fragility. The case of Indonesia, however, provides
instruction as well as an exhortation to every other economically
corrupt system.
Twenty years ago, observers hailed Indonesia as an economic
powerhouse.78 Some analysts even used Indonesia's supposed
economic strength as an argument that corruption might not impose
economic harm. 79 A downturn in the value of Southeast Asian
currencies, however, proved too much of a shock for an economy
riddled by corruption.80 Indonesia's economy collapsed, its dictatorSuharto-fled, and the country has yet to approach financial or
8
economic stability. '
Indonesia is not an anomaly. Since the 1990s, a plethora of
empirical studies have found that corruption negatively affects
economies in general.8 2 Simon Tay and Maria Seda studied the
means by which corruption weakens economies and renders them
susceptible to external shock. They emphasize five means by which

77.
See Yui Suzuki, Binding Constraint on Economic Growth Under ExportOriented Industrializationand Globalization, 44 APPLIED ECON. 2569, 2569-70 (2012)
(noting and explaining Southeast Asia's economic dynamism).
78.
See STEVEN SCHLOSSTEIN, ASIA'S NEW LITTLE DRAGONS: THE DYNAMIC
EMERGENCE OF INDONESIA, THAILAND, AND MALAYSIA 54 (1991) (noting that the
average real rate of growth in manufacturing was 33.8 percent a year between 1982
and 1986).
See, e.g., Ross H. McLeod, Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of
79.
Corruption, 7 AGENDA: J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & REFORM 99, 99 (2000) ("Unlike many
[other countries] that are regarded as highly corrupt, however, [Indonesia's corruption]
was not incompatible with rapid economic progress over three decades."); see also
Robert D. Tronnes, Note, Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 1997
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 97, 103-04 (2000) (describing the
arguments made using Indonesia as an example of growth, and noting that all analysts
now agree that corruption rendered Indonesia's growth unstable).
80.
See WORLD BANK E. ASIA POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECON. MGMT. UNIT,
FOR
CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA: ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY
COMBATING
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
8
(2003),
available
DEVELOPMENT
INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/03-Publication/Combating+Corruption+in+
Indonesia-Oct15.pdf (discussing the fragility of the Indonesian economy despite
outward appearances and noting that "[diecades of collusion between business and
government had resulted in a distorted economy").
81.
Id. (discussing the collapse of Indonesia's fragile economy); Natasha
Hamilton-Hart, Anti-Corruption Strategies in Indonesia, 37 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON.
STUD. 65, 65-66 (2001) (discussing the vulnerability of Indonesia's corruption-ridden
economy and its inability to withstand shocks despite outward appearances of growth).
82.
See Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, supra note 72, at 131 (reporting and
summarizing research). Pak Hung Mo finds that a 1 percent increase in levels of
corruption decreases growth in gross domestic product by almost 0.75 percent. Pak
Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 66 (2001).
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corruption inflicts damage: (1) reduction in productive investment
and growth; (2) macro-fiscal costs, in particular the "loss of massive
amounts of public revenues from taxes, customs duties, and
privatization programs"; (3) redistributionallsocial costs; (4) economic
inefficiency, particularly through the protection of affined firms and
the discouragement of entrepreneurs and competitor firms; and (5)
83
distortion or loss of foreign aid and debt relief programs.
A largely unexplored form of economic damage occurs when
people in a corrupt system turn to parallel institutions to accomplish
tasks normally associated with state institutions. Parallel
institutions often come into existence as a reaction to failures in
state-sanctioned institutions, as people attempt to cobble together
84
means of getting done what the state cannot or will not do for them.
Patently failed states, like the rump states of the former Yugoslavia,
engender numerous parallel institutions, such as shadow economies,
informal schools, and ethnicity-based "underground" distribution
networks. 85 Bribery also stimulates the creation of parallel
institutions because corrupt institutions are dysfunctional; corrupt
state-sanctioned institutions often do not work, or work in ways

83.
Tay & Seda, supranote 5, at 7-8.
84.
George Priest describes, in great detail, the creation of various types of
black markets as responses to failures in formal markets. George L. Priest, The
Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2259
(1994); see also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1298-300 (1998)
(describing the creation of black markets in cigarettes as a response to overregulation
of the formal market). Similarly, Regina Austin describes the creation of a market for
loan sharks when needy persons do not have access to formal sources of credit. Regina
Austin, Of PredatoryLending and the Democratizationof Credit: Preserving the Social
Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions,53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1238-39
(2004); see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (observing that loan
sharking is a national problem in the United States).
85.
See Elizabeth Abraham, The Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations
Accountable to InternationalHuman Rights Standardsfor Executive Order Detentions
in Its Missions in Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1323 (2003) (describing the creation
of parallel institutions by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and noting the "knowledge gap"
between those who worked in the formal sector and those who worked in the informal
sector); Jeffrey S. Morton, The Legality of NATO's Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999:
Implications for the Progressive Development of InternationalLaw, 9 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 75, 77 (2002) (describing parallel institutions created by repressed Albanians
in Kosovo); Henry H. Perritt, Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3, 15
(2005) (describing parallel institutions in Kosovo); Adam Raviv, Jigsaw Sovereignty:
The Economic Consequences of Decentralizationin Post-Dayton Bosnia, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 109, 113-16 (2005) (describing the creation of "pseudo-governmental
structures," "para-states," and "ghost municipalities" in Croatia and Herzegovina and
noting that "[tihe continuing existence of parallel institutions, and the accompanying
corruption that is endemic to them, can serve as a barrier to foreign investment");

Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 56 n.44 (2001)
(describing the creation of parallel institutions among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo,
including the creation of an underground school of law).
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counter to their stated purpose. 8 6 Private actors do not trust corrupt
state-sanctioned institutions and will not use them if it is possible not
to. 8 7 These actors can avoid the necessity of using corrupt statesanctioned institutions by creating parallel institutions in the private
realm or in social space bought through the payment of bribes. 88
In some ways, parallel institutions provide a service by allowing
people to do that which the state will not let them do.8 9 The creation
and maintenance of these institutions, however, imposes costs on a
state or society. 90 The existence of a parallel institution essentially
means that a country spends more than it would spend if the statesanctioned institution functioned properly; the money diverted to the
parallel institutions is money that is not spent on infrastructure or
development. 9 1

86.
See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (1996) (describing corruption as
dysfunctional); Angel Ricardo Oquendo, Corruption and Legitimation Crises in Latin
America, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 475, 488 (1999) (' Moreover, it is precisely the culture of
corruption that, to a significant extent, renders them dysfunctional and illegitimate.").
87.
See James M. Cooper, Access to Justice 1.1, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 429, 43031 (2000) (discussing the withdrawal of Latin Americans from use of the judicial
system because it is corrupt); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based and Regulatory
Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in
the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 573 (1992) ("Why should some
individuals observe the law when others can pay to elude it? If the rule of law isn't the
rule of law, can anarchy be far behind?"); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political
Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 44 (Kimberly
Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (discussing people's mistrust toward corrupt institutions).
See Manash Ranjan Gupta & Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Formal Credit,
88.
Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis, 64
ECONOMICA 331, 340 (1997) (noting that when farmers have to bribe officials to get
loans they go to a moneylender); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Contradictions, Law, and
State Socialism, 25 LAW & SOC.INQUIRY 1021, 1033-34 (2000) (describing relationship
between corruption, market failure and the creation of black markets in the Soviet
Union); see also Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The
Close Relationship Between Public and Private Orders: A Reply to McMillan and
Woodruff, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2478 (2000) ("Hence, if legal systems are
dysfunctional due to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all forms of the
private order to emerge: relational contracts, arbitration, business networks, trade
associations, and social networks.").
See Priest, supra note 84, at 2288 (suggesting that parallel institutions'
89.
capacity to accomplish necessary tasks which government institutions do not creates a
moral justification for parallel institutions).
90.
See WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 13-14 (1997) (finding
that emerging economies spend a disproportionate amount of their budget on
institutions); Marina Ottaway & Theresa Chung, Toward a New Paradigm, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 99, 99 (1999) (stating that institutions are expensive, and questioning
whether some developing countries can afford the institutions that support democracy);
Montrose M. Wolf, The Development of the Teaching-Family Model, 30 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. ANALYSIS 381, 381 (1997) (comparing the costs of different models of
institutions).
91.
See Philip M. Nichols, Corruptionas an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 1307, 1313-16 (2004) (discussing the costs of parallel institutions); see also
Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36
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Corruption Degrades the Connection Between Governments and
People

Persons who reside in Southeast Asia do not trust governments
or legal regimes. 9 2 William Case, who has studied political mistrust
and disengagement in Southeast Asia, concludes that "[p]olitical
parties, state bureaucracies, legislatures, and security forces are
widely dismissed as corrupt and inefficient. ''93 Evidence of political
mistrust and disengagement emerges almost daily in the form of
protests, demonstrations, and political turmoil throughout the
94
region.
Corruption obviously undermines the connection between
democratic governments and their constituencies. As Bruce
Ackerman points out, "A failure to control [corruption] undermines
the very legitimacy of democratic government. If payoffs are a routine
part of life, ordinary people will despair of the very idea that they,
together with their fellow citizens, can control their destinies through
the democratic rule of law. '9 5 Regardless of whether a country
purports to democracy, corruption severely undermines any
connection a government might have to its people, conversely
generating mistrust of government.9 6 When persons within a polity
know that government officials make decisions based on bribes, those
persons understand that those decisions are neither impartial nor
97
made for the benefit of the country or its people.

VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 187 (1995) (noting that the expenditure of resources to work around
corrupt courts severely limits the financial ability to develop other institutions in Latin
America).
92.
See, e.g., QUAH, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing the attitudes of Cambodians
toward government); id. at 8 (noting that the government of Viet Nam "identified
corruption as a major threat to its survival").
93.
Case, supra note 22, at 82.
94.
See Linda Y.C. Lim & Aaron Stern, State Power and Private Profit: The
Political Economy of Corruption in Southeast Asia, 16 ASIAN-PAc. ECON. LITERATURE
18, 20 (2002) (describing anticorruption movements throughout Southeast Asia).
95.
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633,
694 (2000).
96.
See Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova, Corruption,Political
Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies, 47 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 91, 99 (2003) (finding "unambiguous evidence in support of our main
hypothesis: individuals in countries with higher levels of corruption evaluate the
performance of the political system more negatively"); id. at 102 (finding "extremely
robust" evidence that "point[s] to a significant corroding effect of corruption on trust in
civil servants").
97.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 87, at 45 ("[Clorruption undermines the
legitimacy of governments, especially democracies. Citizens may come to believe that
the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder. Corruption undermines claims
that the government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on ability to
pay. It can lead to coups by undemocratic leaders."); see George D. Brown, The
Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86
GEO. L.J. 2045, 2069 (1998) (stating that bribery "creates the impression that
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Empirical observation bears out the hypothesis that corruption
undermines trust in government. 98 Many social scientists consider
corruption to be the single greatest threat to the development of
democracy in emerging economies. 99 In some polities corruption
vitiates support for market and economic reform, 10 0

and-when it

accompanies democratic reform-perversely legitimizes the previous
authoritarian regimes and even creates a nostalgic longing for those
regimes. 1 0 1

government is for sale"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do
Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 113, 153 (2005) ("Corruption erodes democracy through secret influence of
private interests."); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct and Progeny: Morally
Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 689, 692 (2000) ("Bribery also undermines
democracies by effectively relating to the public that the government is for sale.
Corruption further undermines governments by suggesting that bribes will undo
attempts to accomplish societal goals.").
98.
Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 179, 184 (1996) ("Perhaps the greatest casualty of... corruption
has been the erosion of public trust in public institutions and leaders, the foundation of
democracy."); A. W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of
Corruption, 53 INT'L J. 643, 654 (1998) (Can.) (noting that respect for law and legal
institutions is a "casualty" of bribery); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of
Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 71, 79 (1973) ("The effect of
corruption is to generate an atmosphere of distrust which pervades all levels of
administration.").
99.
See,
e.g., LARRY DIAMOND,
DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACY: TOWARD
CONSOLIDATION 92 (1999) (stating that corruption poses a serious threat to the
consolidation of democracy); Alexandru Grigorescu, The Corruption Eruption in EastCentral Europe: The Increased Salience of Corruption and the Role of
Intergovernmental Organizations, 20 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 516, 519 (2006)
("[Corruption] is now seen as one of the greatest threats to the survival of new
democracies around the world."); Mitchell A. Seligson, The Measurement and Impact of
Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, 34 WORLD DEV. 381,
381 (2005) ("Widespread corruption is increasingly seen as one of the most significant
threats to deepening democratization in Latin America (and indeed much of the
democratizing Third World).").
100.
See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 28 (1995) ("Charges of bribery and corruption can easily
erode popular support for economic reform in general, and foreign investment in
particular."); Karl M. Meessen, Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) ("Corruption both in government and private business has
no little role in discrediting freshly installed democratic procedures and freshly
installed free market systems.").
101.
See Grigorescu, supra note 99, at 519 (discussing the corrosion of support
for democracy and the nostalgia for authoritarian regimes engendered by corruption);
Seligson, supra note 99, at 382 (discussing the erosion of support for democratic
reforms and the use of public disgust with democracy by authoritarian leaders).
Several studies empirically measure the decrease in support for democracy that
accompanies increases in corruption in emerging economies. E.g., Anderson &
Tverdova, supra note 96, at 91 (demonstrating that citizens in countries with higher
levels of corruption express more negative evaluations of the performance of the
political system and exhibit lower levels of trust in civil servants); William Mishler &
Richard Rose, What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and
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At a micro level, corruption encourages behaviors in bureaucrats
that sever the connection with the public and that also induce
mistrust.10 2 Corruption creates incentives on the parts of bureaucrats
to delay, hinder, and obfuscate. 10 3 By making information or services
more difficult to obtain the bureaucrats increase the value of
information and services, which enables them to extract larger bribes
104
for providing such information or services.
4.

Corruption Degrades the Quality of Life

Corruption degrades the quality of life in the polities in which it
occurs.10 5 Just as corruption distorts economies, so too does it distort
the social and regulatory environment. Numerous scholars have
measured various means through which corruption degrades the
quality of life. Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Erwin Tiongson,
for example, find that corruption increases child mortality rates,
lowers child birth weight, and increases the dropout rate of children
from primary school. 10 6 Similarly, Maureen Lewis finds strong
negative relationships between corruption and the performance and
viability of healthcare systems. 10 7 Lorenzo Pelligrini and Reyer

Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 30, 33 (2001)
(finding that the expected utility of institutions performing satisfactorily best explains
the origins of political trust in new democracies); Donatella Della Porta & Yves M6ny,
Conclusion, in DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION IN EUROPE 179 (Donatella Della Porta &
Yves M~ny eds., 1996) (listing results of a comparative analysis that details
mechanisms through which corruption weakens democracy).
102.
See Vito Tanzi, supra note 61, at 24, 26 ("[T]he larger the role of the state,
the greater the probability that its instruments will be used by public officials and civil
servants to favor particular groups in addition to themselves. When this happens, the
cost of government rises while the ability of government to correct the shortcomings of
the market falls.").
103.
See Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320, 1323 (1997) (finding that corrupt officials may actually
cause administrative delay in order to attract more bribes); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
87, at 43 (noting that officials may raise a firm's cost by introducing delays as a way to
induce payoffs).
104.
Wade, supra note 63, at 474.
105.
See Simon Chesterman, Imposed Constitutions,Imposed Constitutionalism,
and Ownership, 37 CONN. L. REV. 947, 949 (2005) (stating that corruption in Bosnia
jeopardized quality of life); Steven R. Salbu, TransnationalBribery: The Big Questions,
21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 435, 470 (2001) (arguing that all sectors of modern global
society-businesses, governments, local communities, nongovernmental organizations,
small groups, and individuals-will be affected by the proliferation of corruption).
106.
Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi & Erwin Tiongson, Corruption and the
Provision of Health Care and Education Services 24 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 116, 2000).
107.
Maureen Lewis, Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems
44-45 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 78, 2006).
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Gerlagh find that corruption negatively affects environmental policy
08
and the quality of the environment.'
A study of the issuance of driving licenses in Delhi, India
demonstrates the variety of pernicious influences corruption has on
governance, and how they affect the quality of life. 10 9 In an
endemically corrupt setting, the investigators found that 71 percent
of those issued driving licenses did not even take a driving
examination, and that 62 percent of those given licenses could not
drive. 1 10 At the same time, the investigators found that bureaucrats
created artificial barriers and delays, probably for the purpose of
extracting payments from applicants."' While poor decisions in
approving driving licenses may seem trivial, traffic accidents are a
1 2
significant cause of death in India. 1

II. CORRUPTION CONTROL IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
Malaysia and Singapore present a valuable opportunity for a
comparison of corruption control. The two polities emerge from a
similar, although certainly not identical history, and indeed were
once part of the same country. Each has adopted laws to fight
corruption, and each has created an agency to investigate violations
of those laws. Each has experienced some success in constraining
corruption; Singapore, however, has experienced markedly more
success. Differences between the two countries, therefore, might
provide insights into the successful administration of legal regimes
intended to control corruption.

Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, Corruption, Democracy, and
108.
Environmental Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate, 15 J. ENV'T & DEv.
332, 333 (2006); see Nejat Anbarci, Monica Escaleras & Charles A. Register, The Ill
Effects of Public Sector Corruption in the Water and Sanitation Sector, 85 LAND ECON.
363, 375 (2009) (finding that corruption significantly decreases access to clean water).
109.
Marianne Bertrand et al., Obtaining a Driving License in India: An
Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1639 (2007).
110.
Id. at 1652.
111.
Id. at 1642.
112.
Clare Kapp, WHO Acts on Road Safety to Reverse Accident Trends, 362
LANCET 1125, 1125 (2003).
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A. The HistoricalContext of Malaysia and Singapore

The territory of the country of Malaysia consists of the southern
portion of the Malay Peninsula and the northern portion of the island
of Borneo.1 1 4 Singapore consists of an island at the tip of the Malay
Peninsula.1 15 The physical territory now known as the country of
Malaysia did not constitute a single, unitary polity until 1948, at
which time the British combined several different polities they
controlled." 6 Prior to European influence, the area fell at times
under the loose influence of Thai and Indonesian Kingdoms and
11 7
supported a variety of forms of political organization.
Ethnic Malay peoples have lived on the peninsula for thousands
118
of years and now constitute over half of the population of Malaysia.
Indigenous peoples have lived on the island of Borneo for just as long
and now make up around 11 percent of the population of the
country." 9 Southeast Asia, however, sits at the crossroads of the sea
route between India and China and for over two thousand years each
of those regions created trade entrep6ts and areas of political
influence on the peninsula. 120 Today, approximately 23 percent of
Malaysia's population is of Chinese ethnicity and approximately 7

113.
Tunku Abdul Aziz, the director of Transparency International Malaysia,
states that "[i]n my experience, it is impossible for us to even begin to understand the
impact of corruption on a country without our being acquainted, however superficially,
with that country's social, economic and political background. I make no apology,
therefore, for delving a little into Malaysia's recent history .... " Tunku Abdul Aziz,
International Case Study: Stamping Out Corruption in Malaysia, 56 RESOURCE
MATERIAL SERIES (United Nations Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo, Japan), Dec. 2000, at 393, 393, available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITYUNPAN019124.pdf.
114.
The
World Factbook: Malaysia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/my.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2011).
115.
Id.
116.
NEIL JOSEPH RYAN, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 254 (1976).
Arguably, Japan also created a single unitary polity during its period of occupation
during the Second World War, although it is not clear that the administrative
apparatus created by the Japanese could be described as a polity. See CHEAH BOON
KHENG, RED STAR OVER MALAYA: RESISTANCE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING AND
AFTER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF MALAYA, 1941-1946, at 266 (3d ed. 2003)

(describing Japanese consolidation of administration during occupation).
117.
See RYAN, supra note 116, at 10-14 (describing early Thai and Javan
control over various polities located in the Malay Peninsula).
118.
Id.
119.
See BARBARA WATSON ANDAYA & LEONARD Y. ANDAYA, A HISTORY OF
MALAYSIA 9-11 (2d ed. 2001) (describing migrations and inflows); RYAN, supra note
116, at 4-6 (describing Proto-Malays and early immigrants into the peninsula); see also
L.W. JONES, POPULATIONS OF BORNEO: A STUDY OF THE PEOPLES OF SARAWAK, SABAH
AND BRUNEI 12-16 (1966) (describing indigenous populations of Sabah and Sarawak).
120.
See ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 14-24 (describing Indian and
Chinese influences); RYAN, supra note 116, at 1 (noting competing influences of India
and China).
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percent of Indian, while around 77 percent of Singapore's 12population
1
is of Chinese ethnicity and 8 percent is of Indian ethnicity.
For most of the history of the region, European traders had a
negligible role in the complex and sophisticated ocean trade
network. 12 2 In 1511, however, Portuguese traders reached and
conquered the port city of Malacca, 123 setting off a long struggle
among foreign powers and local Sultanates for control over the sea
lanes near the peninsula. 124 Eventually, through a combination of
military victories in Europe and political alliances throughout the
peninsula, Britain won control over the region. 125 Britain
administered the region through control of or alliances with nine
126
Sultanates and other local governments.
Historical texts mention the island that now constitutes the
physical territory of the nation of Singapore, but that island did not
play an important role in the politics of the region. 127 Few people
lived on or cared about the island until Stamford Raffles took an
interest in 1819.128 Although nominally under the control of the
Sultan of Johor, real control of the area passed from the Portuguese
to the Dutch and eventually-due to Raffle's persistence-to the
British.129 Control of Singapore enabled Britain to counteract Dutch
hegemony in the region, and Singapore quickly became one of the

121.
The World Factbook:Malaysia, supra note 114.
122.
Harry Gelber describes this network: "Long before the 1500s, then, there
was a sophisticated and what now would be called entirely multi-cultural network of
merchants, sailors, officials and cut-throats in ports and settlements from China to
mainland Southeast Asia, to Java, India, and to the coasts of Arabia and East Africa."
HARRY G. GELBER, NATIONS OUT OF EMPIRES: EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ASIA 10 (2001).
123.
See id. at 24-27 (describing the conquest and its cultural consequences);
RYAN, supra note 116, at 46-49 (describing the fall of Malacca). "So decisive was the
Portuguese victory that the fall of Meleka in 1511 has usually been seen as the end of a
chapter in Malay history." ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 37.
124.
See GELBER, supra note 122, at 27-49 (describing the contests among
European powers).
125.
See id. at 53-88 (describing British consolidation of influence in the Malay
Peninsula); RYAN, supra note 116, at 107 (describing Treaty of London, 1824, which
delineated the areas of Southeast Asia over which Britain and the Netherlands could
attempt to exert influence). Harry Gelber emphasizes that "[u]p to the end of the
Napoleonic wars (and again later) the expansion of British and France, in particular,
was driven by Anglo-French contention in Europe more than by developments in Asia."
GELBER, supranote 122, at 88.
126.
See ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 126 (describing period and
stating that Britain sought influence rather than territory); GELBER, supra note 122, at
130-31 (describing period and suggesting that Britain sought to decrease costly strife
among Malay polities).
127.
See Arthur Lim Joo-Jock, Geographical Setting, in A HISTORY OF
SINGAPORE 3, 3-10 (Ernest C. T. Chew & Edwin Lee eds., 1991). A settlement called
Temasek existed on the island. Id. at 4.
128.
Id. at 10; see RYAN, supra note 116, at 106 (stating that approximately 150
people lived on the island).
129.
See RYAN, supra note 116 at 103-08 (describing succession).
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most important ports in Southeast Asia. 130 For the British it acted as
an entrep6t between India and China, for Arab and other traders it
offered respite from the high tariffs charged by the Dutch in ports
ethnic Chinese
under their control. 131 The port grew rapidly, with
132
comprising the largest part of the new population.
Britain governed the settlement somewhat loosely, and
Singapore gained a reputation for lawlessness, drugs, and
prostitution. 1 33 Nonetheless the importance of Singapore to Britain
continued to grow, and by the advent of the Second World War
Singapore housed the command structure for much of the British
134
military defenses of Southeast Asia.
During the Second World War, Japan occupied almost all of
Southeast Asia; the Japanese military crushed European resistance,
including that based in Singapore. 135 The thorough victory over
136
while
European power deflated the myth of European superiority,
the heavy-handed occupation itself strengthened the local peoples'
sense of solidarity and community and eventually their desire for
independence. 1 37 After the war, Britain consolidated all of the

Id. at 105.
130.
See id. at 126 (stating that its free trade policy was the most important
131.
factor in Singapore's growth).
132.
Id. at 126-27 ("Singapore ... had grown in fifty years from a small fishing
village to the most important trading centre in Southeast Asia.").
See id. at 127-28 (discussing loose administration, scarcity of police, and
133.
abundance of organized crime).
See BRIAN P. FARRELL, JOHN N. MIKSIC, MALCOLM H. MURFETT & CHIANG
134.
MING SHUN, BETWEEN TWO OCEANS: A MILITARY HISTORY OF SINGAPORE FROM FIRST
SETTLEMENT TO FINAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL 145-70 (2004) (discussing the "Singapore
Strategy" and Singapore's role in British defense in the inter-war years).
For thorough discussions of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, see
135.
generally BOON KHENG, supra note 116 (noting the racial conflicts and social unrest
during and after Japanese occupation); PAUL H. KRATOSKA, THE JAPANESE
OCCUPATION OF MALAYA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY (1997) (discussing
Japanese occupation from a political and economic perspective). Paul Kratoska notes
that the Japanese occupation engenders many misconceptions and stereotypes.
KRATOSKA, supra, at 1-2.

See ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 257-58 (describing defeat of the
136.
British and the "irreparable harm to British prestige"). Gelber states,
The trend towards imperial dissolution was therefore set well before 1939. But
the Second World War accelerated it decisively. Pearl Harbor, the fall of
Singapore, the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, Malaya, Indonesia and
Burma, all demonstrated that the West was not invincible. European prestige
and power in Southeast Asia were destroyed.
GELBER, supra note 122, at 162.
See BOON KHENG, supra note 116, at 20-25 (describing atrocities of
137.
occupation); KRATOSKA, supra note 135, at 348-49 (describing sense of nationalism and
community that arose during occupation); RYAN, supra note 116, at 282 (describing
suffering of Singapore during occupation).
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peninsular polities under its control except Singapore l3 8 into a single
Crown Colony, the Malayan Union, but popular resistance led to the
replacement of the Union with the Federation of Malaya, which
13 9
restored some authority to local Sultanates.
Independence movements continued to fight for autonomy, and
140
in 1957 Britain granted independence to the Federation of Malaya.
The British retained Singapore as a Crown Colony, but the colony
took on increasing amounts of self-rule and continued to argue for
independence. 14 1 In 1963, the Crown Colony of Singapore, along with
the Crown Colonies of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo,
joined the Federation of Malaya, which then changed its official name
to simply "Malaysia."'1 4 2 In 1965 Singapore withdrew from Malaysia
and became a separate independent nation. 143 What had once been a
collection of Sultanates, communities, and a barely inhabited island
now stood as two independent nations equal to all in the Westphalian
community of nations.
Singapore styled itself as a democracy, although one political
party has dominated all Singaporean elections. 144 Lee Kuan Yew
ruled the country as Prime Minister from independence until 1990.145
Two other members of the People's Action Party have served as Prime
Minister since then. 14 6 Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party
undertook numerous projects aimed at improving Singapore's
enfeebled economy. 14 7 Singapore has enjoyed significant economic

138.
The British considered Singapore too valuable both as a naval base and as
a trade entrep6t. ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 265.
139.
Britain conceived of the Malay Union during the war, which made
consultation with local persons inside the occupied peninsula impossible. RYAN, supra
note 116, at 254. The Federation of Malaya, designed in response to local demands, not
only gave some degree of power to Sultans, it also restored a degree of sovereignty to
states and accorded special privilege to indigenous Malays. See ANDAYA & ANDAYA,
supra note 119, at 265-68 (describing the Union and Federation); RYAN, supra note
116, at 254-60 (describing Union and Federation).
140.
RYAN, supra note 116, at 281.
141.
See id. at 282-90 (describing period and movement for independence).
142.
See ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 119, at 285-86. The concern over the
effect of Singapore's Chinese population was mitigated by the addition of the
populations of Sabah and Sarawak. Id. at 283.
143.
RYAN, supra note 116, at 301.
144.
Chua Beng Huat, Political Culturalism, Representation and the People's
Action Party of Singapore, 14 DEMOCRATIZATION 911, 913 (2007).
145.
Hong Lysa, The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore's History, 33 J.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 545, 545 (2002).
146.
Kenneth Paul Tan, Singapore's National Day Rally Speech: A Site of
Ideological Negotiation, 37 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 292, 297 (2007).
147.
See Hussin Mutalib, Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in
Singapore, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 313, 313-15 (2000) (discussing growth policies of Lee's
government).
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growth, but is not considered fully democratic and does not offer its
148
residents a full panoply of freedoms.
Malaysia has not been ruled by a single party; instead, a
coalition, the Barisan Nasional, has controlled the Parliament since
independence. 1 49 Mahathir bin Mohamad held the office of Prime
Minister from 1982 to 2004, exerting as much influence on Malaysia
as Lee in Singapore. 150 Mahathir introduced numerous projects to
modernize Malaysia's economy, and is widely credited with the
significant economic growth the country has enjoyed. 15 1 More
controversially, Mahathir introduced the New Economic Policy, which
among other things, attempts to diminish the gap between affluent
ethnic Chinese and less affluent ethnic Malay peoples by privileging
152
indigenous Malaysian persons.
B. Corruption Control in Malaysia and Singapore
Malaysia initially experienced little corruption. 1 3 Tunku Abdul
Aziz speculates that corruption began to flourish in Malaysia with the
advent of the New Economic Policy in the 1 9 7 0 s. 1 54 In its attempt to
manipulate the economy in favor of the native peoples of the
Malaysian archipelago, the New Economic Policy places a great deal
of economic discretion in government officials; that power may be
used corruptly. 155 Regardless of the cause, corruption eventually
15 6
became endemic in the new country.

148.

ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2010: DEMOCRACY IN

RETREAT (2010), available at http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/DemocracyIndex-2010web.pdf.
149.
Chin-Huat Wong, James Chin & Norani Othman, Malaysia-Towards a
Topology of an Electoral One-Party State, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 920, 923 (2010).
150.
See Pepinsky, supra note 61, at 114-19 (discussing political control by and
policies of the Barisan Nasional party).
151.
See Jomo S.K. & Chang Yii Tan, The Political Economy of Post-Colonial
Transformation, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND MALAYSIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 22,
30-47 (Jomo K.S. & Wong Sau Ngan eds., 2008) (explaining and evaluating Mahathir's
economic policies).
152.
See Li-Ann Thio, ConstitutionalAccommodation of the Rights of Ethnic and
Religious Minorities in Plural Democracies: Lessons and Cautionary Tales from SouthEast Asia, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV. 43, 63-64 (2010) (describing the New Economic
Program).
153.
Many persons operate under the misconception that corruption has always
pervaded economies throughout the world. Widespread, pervasive corruption is
actually a relatively recent phenomenon; Mois6s Naim famously refers to its advent as
the "corruption eruption." Naim, supranote 24, at 245.
154.
Aziz, supra note 113, at 393-94.
155.
See
Hanming Fang
& Peter
Norman,
Government-Mandated
Discriminatory Policies: Theory and Evidence, INT'L ECON. REV. 361, 364-65 (2006)
(describing great amounts of discretion in the New Economic Policy).
156.
See R.S. Milne, Levels of Corruption in Malaysia: A Comment on the Case of
Bumiputra Malaysia Finance, 9 ASIAN J. PUBL. ADMIN. 56, 56 (1987) (discussing the
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In Singapore, on the other hand, corruption flourished from the
founding of the colony to its independence. 157 In its earliest years, the
British cared little for establishing law in Singapore, tolerating even
the trafficking of women. 158 During the Japanese occupation, poor
economic conditions fueled rampant corruption. 159 The British
Military Administration following Japanese occupation lived on
corruption.16 0 By the time Singapore was granted independence, the
People's Action Party was able to reveal that their opponents in the
general election had accepted bribes from the U.S. government, a
161
revelation that swept the Party into power.
Countries faced with extensive or highly public corruption often
respond by creating within the government a formal institution that
specifically targets corruption. In the United States, for example,
special prosecutors are

appointed

and given extraordinary

power

when corruption is alleged to have occurred at senior levels of the
federal government. 162 Many emerging economies have standing

agencies to investigate or prosecute corruption. In East Asia, the
Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption may be the
best known such agency, and often serves as a model for other
163
Both Malaysia and Singapore have created
emerging economies.

such agencies. 164 Each has also engaged in the international regime
1 65
that has evolved to combat corruption.

growth of corruption in Malaysia and attributing it not only to the New Economic Plan
but also to exploitation of natural resources).
See Jon S.T. Quah, Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be
157.
Learned?, 9 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 29, 29 (2001) (describing corruption as
"a way of life" in colonial Singapore).
158.
See JON S. T. QUAH, CURBING CORRUPTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF SIX COUNTRIES 109-10 (2003) (describing rampant corruption and lawlessness in
early Singapore); JAMES FRANCIS WARREN, AH Ku AND KARAYUKI-SAN: PROSTITUTION
IN SINGAPORE 1870-1940, at 68-71 (1993) (describing the trafficking of women and
noting that Singapore "offered practically unrestricted possibilities to traffickers").
159.
See Quah, supra note 157, at 30 (describing corruption during Japanese
occupation).
See QUAH, supra note 158, at 110 (noting that the British Military
160.
Administration was nicknamed the "Black Market Administration").
161.
Id. at 114.
162.
See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86
GEO. L.J. 2307, 2310-21 (1998) (describing appointments of independent counsel in the
United States).
163.
See C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development and Good Governance:
Challenges for Promoting Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 475, 507
(2008) (referring to Hong Kong's agency as a "model" for other countries); Bertrand de
Speville, Anticorruption Commissions: The "Hong Kong Model" Revisited, 17 ASIA-PAC.
REV. 47, 47-48 (2010) (suggesting that the Hong Kong Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) should serve as a model).
164.
See infra notes 171-89 and accompanying text (describing Malaysia's AntiCorruption Commission Act); infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (describing
Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau).
165.
See infra notes 169-70, 193-94.
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Malaysia

Malaysian law criminalizes many forms of corruption, including
bribery. The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act, for
example, makes criminal the conduct of any person who:
(a) corruptly solicits or receives or agrees to receive for himself or for
any other person; or (b) corruptly gives, promises or offers to any person
whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any
gratification as an inducement to or a reward for, or otherwise on
account of - (A) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in
respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take
place; or (B) any officer of a public body doing or forbearing to do
anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or
16 6
likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned.

Numerous other laws exist, covering actions such as nepotism and
167
diversion of government funds.
Malaysia is a signatory to the United Nations Anti-Corruption
Convention, and ratified the Convention in 2008.168 Malaysia also
endorsed the Asian Development Bank-Organization for Economic
169
Development and Cooperation Anti-Corruption Action Plan.
At the time this research was conducted, the Anti-Corruption
Agency (ACA) (in Malay, Badan Pencegah Rasuah) was tasked with
combating corruption. The ACA was founded in 1967 by bringing
together a number of existing bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption
Unit and special investigative departments in the policing system. 170
The ACA was within the Prime Minister's office: the Director General
of the ACA was appointed by the King 71 on advice of the Prime

166.
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, s. 16 (No. 694/2009)
(Malay.).
167.
Elections Offences Act 1954, s. 10 (No. 5/1954) (Malay.); Malaysian AntiCorruption Commission Act 2009 s. 16 (Malay.).
168.
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption:Signature/Ratification
Status, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (listing Malaysia as a
signatory and its ratification date as the 24th of September, 2008).
169.
See Asian Dev. Bank, OECD & Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the
Pacific,
The
Initiative's Member
Countries
and
Economies,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en-34982156 35315367_35030743 1. 1_1,0
0.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (listing Malaysia as one of twenty-eight countries in
the Asia-Pacific region that has formally endorsed the Action Plan and committed to its
goals).
170.
See Patrick Meagher, Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 8
J. POL'Y REFORM 69, 76 (2005) (describing the creation of the ACA).
171.
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy; the nominal head of state is a King
elected for a five-year term by and from the hereditary rulers of the nine states still
ruled by hereditary rulers. Aaron D. Davidson, Note, "I Want My Censored MTV'Malaysia's Censorship Regime Collides with the Economic Realities of the Twenty-First
Century, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97, 125 (1998). The role of the King is largely
ceremonial; power resides with the Prime Minister. Id.
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Minister, and its budget resided with the office of the Prime
Minister.172
The ACA was divided into six divisions: Prosecution,
Training,
and
an
Prevention,
Investigation,
Information,
Administrative Division. 173 This organization's tasks included
detecting and investigating incidents of corruption, monitoring the
behavior of public officials, and preventing corruption in
government. 174 The ACA received and processed thousands of
anonymous tips each year. 175 The Investigation Division was very
active, producing a steady stream of investigations and referrals for
prosecution. 1 76 The ACA also engaged in several programs to educate
the public on issues of corruption, rally public opinion against
corruption, and persuade members of the public to take positive
action against corruption. 177 The agency also made appeals to family
178
well-being, self-respect, love of country, morality, and religion.
Programs run by the ACA included advertising, educational videos,
179
and a television show.
The ACA did not prosecute corruption cases. Instead, a
Department of the Prosecution Division of the Office of the Attorney
General was devoted to working with the ACA to prosecute those
cases.' 80 That Department made the final determination as to
whether a case would or would not be prosecuted. 81' Cases were
prosecuted by a Deputy Public Prosecutor, under the direction of the
Attorney General of Malaysia. 8 2 The Attorney General is appointed
83
by the King, on the advice of the Prime Minister.

172.
See Meagher, supranote 170, at 95 (describing appointment process).
173.
See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM [UNDP] PARAGON, CASE STUDY:
ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: MALAYSIA (2000), available at http://unpanl.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/eropa/unpan002690.pdf.
See Nik Rosnah Wan Abdullah, Eradicating Corruption: The Malaysian
174.
Experience, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 42, 46 (2008) (describing functions of the ACA).
175.
See UNDP PARAGON, supra note 173, at 3 (noting that the ACA receives
over 8000 reports a year and that informants must be anonymous).
176.
See Aziz, supra note 113, at 398 (describing functions of the ACA).
177.
See PATRICK MEAGHER & CARYN VOLAND, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.,
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES (ACAS): ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAM BRIEF 25 (2006),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and.governance/publications/
pdfs/ACA 508c.pdf (providing data on case flow); Meagher, supra note 170, at 95
(noting the rate of activity of the ACA).
Discussants knowledgeable about the ACA's programs described these and
178.
other initiatives.
UNDP PARAGON, supra note 173, at 1.
179.
180.
See MEAGHER & VOLAND, supra note 177, at 9 (describing arrangement);
Abdullah, supra note 174, at 47 (describing decision to prosecute).
181.
TRANSPARENCY INT'L MALAY., TOWARD A CORRUPTION FREE MALAYSIA 13
(2006), available at http://www.transparency.org.my/documents/TOWARDS%20A%
20CORRUPTION%20FREE%20MALAYSIA.pdf.
182.
Id. at 14.
183.
See Abdullah, supra note 174, at 47 (describing and expressing concern
over this arrangement).
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Malaysia has recently replaced the ACA with the Malaysian
Anticorruption Commission (MACC) (in Malay, Suruhanjanya
Pencegaha Rasuah Malaysia).l8 4 Then Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi proposed formation of the MACC to rectify perceived
weaknesses in the ACA by granting the MACC independence and
giving it real authority. 8 5 Several members of Parliament expressed
concern that the MACC would make groundless but damaging
accusations and that it would become a politicized agency.1 8 6 Their
concerns lead to three compromises by the Prime Minister: the MACC
is subject to strict budget oversight by the Parliament; an
independent board oversees the MACC; and as was the case with the
ACA, the MACC itself does not prosecute corruption. 8 7v Instead, the
Public Prosecutor of Malaysia has responsibility to prosecute
allegations of corruption.' 8 8 The MACC has full investigatory powers,
and recommends cases for prosecution to the Public Prosecutor. 8 9
Nonetheless, the Public Prosecutor does not have to abide by a
recommendation of the MACC. 190
2.

Singapore

Singapore criminalizes many forms of corruption, including
bribery. The Prevention of Corruption Act, for example, subjects to
criminal prosecution:
Any person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other
person - (a) corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive for himself,
or for any other person; or (b) corruptly give, promise or offer to any
person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any
gratification as an inducement to or reward for, or otherwise on account

184.

MACC

Background,

MALAYSIAN

ANTI-CORRUPTION

COMMISSION,

http://www.sprm.gov.my (last updated Sept. 3, 2011).
185.
Prime Minister Abdullah owed much of his electoral success in 2003 to his
popular image as someone who could combat corruption; a survey conducted in 2008
found that the public had grown deeply suspicious of his anticorruption credentials. See
MERDEKA CTR. FOR Op. RESEARCH, Q2 2008 PENINSULA MALAYSIA VOTER OPINION POLL
7 (2008), available at http://www.merdeka.org/v2/index.php?option=comjotloader&
section=files&task=download&cid=38_lcf7a8c16ad4d356102e55795621dc15&Itemid=6
8 (providing graph showing "corruption and abuse of power" as one of the "most
important problems affecting Malaysia" according to respondents).
186.
As related to the author by parties involved in the discussions in
Parliament.
187.
See Noore Alam Siddiquee, Combating Corruption and Managing Integrity
in Malaysia:A CriticalOverview of Recent Strategiesand Initiatives, 10 PUB. ORG. REV.
153, 161 (2010) (describing the oversight committees and the lack of prosecutorial
powers).
188.
Datuk K.C. Vohrah, MACC and the ProsecutionIssue, STAR (Dec. 12, 2010)
(Malay.),
available at
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/members-opinions and_
comments/macc-andtheprosecution issue.html.
189.

See MALAYSIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, http://www.sprm.gov.my

(last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
190. Id.
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of - (i) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any
matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed; or (ii) any
member, officer or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do
anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or
191
proposed, in which such public body is concerned.

Singapore is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, and ratified the Convention in 2009.192 Singapore has
Economic
endorsed the Asian Development Bank-Organization for 193
Development and Cooperation Anti-Corruption Action Plan.
Singapore uses an agency similar to the MACC to investigate
corruption. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was
formed in 1952 as an agency distinct from other investigatory
agencies. 194 Prior to the creation of the CPIB, corruption fell within
195
the jurisdiction of a special branch of the Singapore Police Force.
At that time, Singapore experienced rampant and pervasive
corruption, to the extent that the British colonial government felt
that corruption posed a threat to Singapore's position as a trade
19 6

entrep6t.

The CPIB shares a lack of independence with the MACC. The
Prime Minister's Office has budget oversight over the CPIB, and the
Director of the CPIB reports directly to the Prime Minister. 19 7 The
CPIB is independent of other policing bodies and government
198
agencies.
The CPIB's primary mission is to investigate corruption. 199 The
Investigation Department has two divisions, one that investigates
public sector corruption and one that investigates private sector

191.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1960, c. 241, § 5 (Sing.).
192.
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Signature/Ratification
Status, supra note 168 (listing Singapore as a signatory and its ratification date as the
6th of November, 2009).
See Asian Dev. Bank, OECD & Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the
193.
Pacific, supra note 169 (listing Singapore as one of twenty-eight countries in the AsiaPacific region that has formally endorsed the Action Plan and committed to its goals).
194.
At this time Singapore was administered as a British colony. Singapore
joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963, and became a separate, independent nation
in 1965. The CPIB survived each of these changes. Under British rule the CPIB was
not effective; it became effective when restructured by Lee's Political Action Party. See
QUAH, supra note 158, at 113-14 (describing British attempt and failure).
195.
Quah, supra note 157, at 32.
For an uncritical history of its role in reversing endemic corruption in
196.
Singapore, published by the CPIB, see CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU,
SWIFT AND SURE ACTION - FOUR DECADES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK (2003).
See Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual
197.
and the Collective, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 739, 782 (1998) (describing control of the
CPIB); Jon S. T. Quah, Globalizationand Corruption Control in Asian Countries: The
Case for Divergence, 3 PUB. MGMT. REV. 453, 463 (2001) (same).
198.
Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore
Way, 30 H.K. L.J. 91, 111 (2000).
See Quah, supra note 197, at 463 (describing duties of the CPIB).
199.
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corruption. 200
The
Operations
Department
also
conducts
investigations through its Intelligence Division, which obtains and
processes information regarding specific cases and corruption in
201
general.
The CPIB does not prosecute cases but instead refers cases to the
Attorney General's Office. 202 The Attorney General makes
determinations regarding prosecution and manages the prosecution
20 3
of cases that go forward.
The CPIB also reviews the practices of government offices in
Singapore in order to identify weaknesses or practices that might
facilitate corruption and to make recommendations to rectify those
weaknesses. 20 4 Government offices have no obligation to institute
these recommendations, but an office that does not risks approbation
20 5
from other government officials.
Although the CPIB possess somewhat more structure, the CPIB
and the ACA (now MACC) are quite similar. Both answer to the
Prime Minister, both are independent of other investigatory agencies
but must rely on an Attorney General to actually prosecute cases,
both are tasked with strengthening existing structures and attitudes,
and both exist for the purpose of controlling corruption. Both are also
regarded as successes. 206 Singapore, however, has experienced more

success than has Malaysia. 20 7 Exploration into that difference might
yield insight into the effective implementation and enforcement of
corruption laws.

III.

DISCUSSIONS ON CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

This paper relies on a qualitative methodology. Qualitative
methodologies are used far less than quantitative methodologies in

200.
See
About
Us,
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
INVESTIGATION
BUREAU,
http://app.cpib.gov.sg/cpib-new/user/default.aspx?pglD=123 (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203.

See NAT'L INTEGRITY Sys., TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY STUDY

REPORT - SINGAPORE 2006, at 7 (2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/
content/download/12597/123955/file/SingaporeNIS_2006.pdf (discussing relationship
of the CPIB to prosecution of cases).
204.
Tan, supra note 198, at 111.
205.

See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 127 (1988) (reporting

that the CPIB causes "fear and trembling").
206.
See id. at 126-27 (praising the CPIB); Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang,
Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 46 (2002) (noting the
"notable success" of the CPIB); Meagher, supra note 170, at 100 (including the ACA in
a group of agencies "significantly more successful than the others have been"); Quah,
supra note 197, at 467 (noting success of the ACA).
207.
See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text (discussing corruption in
Singapore and Malaysia).
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both legal and international relations scholarship. 20 8 A brief
explanation of the use of the qualitative methodology is therefore in
order.
Qualitative methodologies are usually described in contrast to
quantitative methodologies: qualitative methodologies primarily
analyze data in the form of words while quantitative methodologies
primarily analyze data in the form of numbers. 20 9 Quantitative
methodologies provide insights into meta structures and allow
manipulation and processing of large amounts of data. Quantitative
research has provided valuable insights into corruption. 210 As is true
of any methodology, however, quantitative research does have
limitations and may not fully discern subtleties. 211 Many scholars
who conduct research on social phenomenon, therefore, suggest
utility in both quantitative and qualitative methodologies when
phenomenon. 212
social
complex
attempting to comprehend
Understanding nuances in the creation, implementation and effects of
legal regimes requires multiple methodologies, especially in emerging
213
economies.

208.
See Lois Gander, Diana Lowe & Mary Stratton, The Civil Justice System
and the Public: Highlights of the Alberta Pilots, 42 ALTA. L. REV. 803, 804 n.5 (2005)
(Can.) (discussing prejudices against qualitative research); Sarosh Kuruvilla,
Industrial Relations Theory, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 522, 523 (2000) (book review)
(discussing problems created by international relations scholarship that elevates
quantitative research over qualitative).
209.
See Roger Bullock, Michael Little & Spencer Millham, The Relationships
Between Quantitative and QualitativeApproaches in Social Policy Research, in MIXING
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 81, 85 (Julia Brannen ed., 1992)
(discussing differences and similarities between qualitative and quantitative
methodologies).
210.
E.g., KPUNDEH, supra note 6 (reporting and analyzing data from surveys
conducted in Sierra Leone); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681
(1995) (using quantitative measures of corruption to determine that corruption
negatively effects foreign direct investment and thus economic growth). These are
merely examples of groundbreaking quantitative research; to list all outstanding
quantitative research would overwhelm this paper.
211.
1. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology
and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF DecreaseAdoption Rates and Should It Matter?,
95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 573 (2010) ("Studying human behavior through [quantitative]
data on behavior is a useful complement, but not a substitute to more qualitative
methods."); Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1270 (1997) (book
review) ("[Q]uantitative empirical research ... may overlook the style, setting,
normative gait, and human quirkiness of ...law").
212.
See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care:Lessons from HIV
Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831, 892 (1998) ("Qualitative and quantitative research are
highly interdependent."); Hazel Qureshi, Integrating Methods in Applied Research in
Social Policy: A Case Study of Careers, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 209, at 101, 120 (discussing the need for a variety
of methodologies).
213.
See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for
Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 785 (2008) (advocating a
"mixed-methods approach" and arguing that "[e]ncouraging scholarship from multiple
scholars with a broad set of perspectives and skill sets can promote nuanced
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Quantitative methodologies have already been applied to
corruption in Singapore, Malaysia, and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the
first section of this paper relies on treatments of quantitative data 214
to
evaluate the existence and persistence of corruption in the region.
As the Asian Development Bank points out, however, "[n]o one
instrument or method can provide a complete picture [of corruption
2 15
regimes]. Each survey tool has its utility and its limitations."
While quantitative methods provide insights into meta
structures, correlations and causality, qualitative methods provide
2 16
insights into the nuances of structures, attitudes and relationships.
As Linda Ross Meyer suggests, qualitative methods can discern the
"style, setting, normative gait, and human quirkiness of ...law. '2 17
Thus, when attempting to understand differences in perceived
effectiveness of corruption control regimes it seems distinctly possible
that qualitative methods may reveal insights not illuminated by

understandings of population parameters and encourage the replication and
convergence of research"); Gander, Lowe & Stratton, supra note 208, at 804 (stressing
the need for multiple methodologies for understanding the context of legal change);
Jens Meierhenrich, The UN InternationalCriminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 699 (2008) (book review)
("International legal scholarship is ignoring, at its own peril, the significance of
qualitative research .. ");Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1555, 1565 (2003) (suggesting that understanding of legal institutions is acquired
through "using whichever tools seem most appropriate to each subtopic" and through
"put[ting] these sources in generative conversation with each other"); see also Jeremy J.
Kingsley, Legal Transplantation:Is This What the Doctor Ordered and Are the Blood
Types Compatible? The Application of InterdisciplinaryResearch to Law Reform in the
Developing World - A Case Study of Corporate Governance in Indonesia, 21 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 522 (2004) (describing the usefulness of qualitative
methodologies in understanding emerging economies).
214.
See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text (discussing levels of
corruption in Southeast Asia).
215.
ASIAN DEV. BANK & OECD, supra note 14, at 106.
216.
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors'& Officers' Liability InsuranceMarket, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 491 (2007) (qualitative methods offer a "nuanced view inside a field that
quantitative data cannot provide"); Bullock, Little & Millham, supra note 209, at 86
("Qualitative research, in contrast, provides 'greater understanding of the meaning and
context of behaviours and the processes that take place within observed patterns of
interrelated factors' and enables researchers to examine the perceptions different
participants have of the same situation."); Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Social
Mechanisms: The Back Pocket Map: Social Class and Cultural Capital as Transferable
Assets in the Advancement of Second-Generation Immigrants, 620 ANNALS 116, 120
(2008) (lauding quantitative methods but noting that "it is only .through qualitative
means that exceptions may be properly explained"); Laurel Currie Oates, Beating the
Odds: Reading Strategies of Law Students Admitted Through Alternative Admissions
Programs, 83 IOWA L. REV. 139, 144 (1997) ("[Q]ualitative research assumes that
variables are complex, interwoven, and difficult to measure ... .
217.
Meyer, supra note 211, at 1270.
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quantitative methods. 218 This paper relies on data collected through
qualitative methods.
The research described in this paper involves interviews and
discussions conducted by the author with government officials,
businesspeople, and, in the case of Malaysia, members of civil society.
Interviews were conducted in a variety of settings, usually at the
suggestion of each discussant. The interviewer did not use a standard
the same
set of questions, although each interview involved roughly
2 19
material. The amount of time spent on interviews varied.
Discussants were not always informed at the outset that subjects
to be discussed included corruption, but every discussant was given
emphatic assurances of absolute confidentiality. Out of respect for the
discussants, any possible identifying characteristics have been
removed from this paper. Discussants generally approached the topic
openly, although differences in the manner in which discussants
220
reacted are worth analyzing.
The research does not pretend to encompass a sample size that
would satisfy a quantitative study, nor does it claim comprehensive
breadth (particularly with respect to Malaysia). In Malaysia, the
author talked with discussants in Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, and
Sabah. 221 Conversations were not recorded, and the author has by
agreement destroyed all notes taken during the conversations.
Discussions revealed three differences that merit further study:
attitudes among government officials towards corruption, manners in
which corruption manifests itself, and reactions toward agency
responses to corruption.
A. Attitudes Toward Corruption
The first observation is also the most subtle, and in some ways
the most difficult to describe in a scholarly manner. It is also the

218.
The author does not suggest that qualitative methods alone suffice in fully
describing corruption; the author has engaged in quantitative research within this
field. E.g., Philip M. Nichols, Who Allows FacilitatingPayments?, 14 AGORA WITHOUT
FRONTIERS 303, 303-23 (2009) (Greece) (using quantitative methods to evaluate
corporate codes of conduct); Nichols, supranote 6 (using a survey conducted throughout
Kazakhstan to find insights into Kazakhstani attitudes toward corruption); Nichols,
Siedel & Kasdin, supra note 6 (using surveys to illustrate similar attitudes toward
corruption).
The author of this paper has conducted hundreds of interviews in West
219.
Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Central America, South America, Central
Europe, East Europe, and the former Soviet Union. No two interviews have been the
same.
220.
See infra notes 222-71 and accompanying text.
221.
The author wants to make clear that he met and talked with people in
Malaysia about subjects other than corruption. No conclusions regarding topics of
conversation should be drawn from the fact that the author met and talked with a
given person.
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observation that may provide the greatest insight into the different
degrees to which Singapore and Malaysia have been successful in
their efforts to control corruption. This observation has to do with the
manner in which Singaporean and Malaysian discussants reacted to
the topic of corruption.
1.

Singapore

Discussing corruption with Singaporean officials is slightly
In
different than similar discussions with officials in other countries. 222
general, people are surprisingly open to discussions of corruption.
Obviously, the issue of corruption can at times engender caution, but
far more often the topic is broached candidly. The author of this paper
has listened to hundreds of first-hand accounts of illicit behavior,
often unsolicited. 223 When discussing corruption with Singaporean
officials, however, one encounters a reaction that almost certainly
plays a significant role in how Singapore effectively deals with
corruption. Yet this reaction becomes almost anecdotal when
described.
The initial reaction of most Singaporean officials to discussions
of corruption is visceral, rather than intellectual. The reaction usually
begins with a spontaneous look of distaste on the official's face, a
pulling back of the body from the zone of interaction with the
interviewer, a short hesitation before speaking, and a comment such
as "oh, we don't do that" or "well, corruption is wrong." The official
does not immediately respond with observations about the illegality
of corruption, the negative consequences of engaging in corrupt acts,
or the harm that corruption inflicts on society. After the initial
reaction, officials are quite able to engage in lengthy and thoughtful
discussions.
Research on the precise meaning of body language is difficult
and faces real limits. 224 Nonetheless, research suggests that
nonverbal signals constitute a critically important facet of
communication. 225 In particular, nonverbal indicators can convey

222.
See Akhil Gupta, Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the
Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State, 22 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 375, 375-76 (1995)
(describing the ease with which discussants discussed corruption).
See Michael Rowe, Tripping over Molehills: Ethics and the Ethnography of
223.
Police Work, 10 INT'L J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY 37, 44-47 (2007) (discussing ethical
and other problems when encountering corruption in fieldwork).
See Miles L. Patterson, Strategic Functions of Nonverbal Exchange, in
224.
STRATEGIC INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 273, 276 (John A. Daly & John M.
Wiemann eds., 1994) (discussing behavioral research and its limitations).
Ezequiel Morsella, Lindsay R. L. Larson & John A. Bargh, Indirect
225.
Cognitive Control, Working-Memory-Related Movements, and Sources of Automatisms,
in EXPRESSING ONESELF / EXPRESSING ONE'S SELF: COMMUNICATION, COGNITION,
LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY 61, 61-62 (Ezequiel Morsella ed., 2010).
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both communicative and informative signals: communicative signals
are under the control of the actor while informative signals are tied to
processes much deeper in that actor's mind.22 6 In general, nonverbal
227
signals can reflect processes deeply embedded within a person.
The behaviors of Singaporean respondents seemed first to
indicate a visceral, almost emotional response to corruption rather
than a fully thought-out response. 228 The posture and body
movements of the respondents seemed to indicate repugnance at the
thought of corruption. The facial expression briefly registered
disgust. 229 The immediacy of the reaction also suggests an automatic
response rather than a carefully analyzed response. 230 The
automaticity of this visceral reaction suggests that the response to
corruption is embedded in the consciousness of the respondents. 231
Comparison could be made to a suggestion to a person that the
person kill someone. The vast, vast majority of persons in most
cultures do not kill other persons. Interestingly, the reason that most
people do not kill has nothing to do with an analysis of the potential
consequences or the possible harm to society; most people do not
intellectually process decisions to kill or not to kill. 232 Rather, most
people do not kill because the idea that killing is wrong is ingrained
into their psyche and their sense of self.23 3 A suggestion that they kill
someone would almost certainly be met with an initial visceral
reaction.

23 4

226.
Randall A. Gordon, Daniel Druckman, Richard M. Rozelle & James C.
Baxter, Non-Verbal Behaviour as Communication:Approaches, Issues and Research, in
THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SKILLS 73, 81-82 (Owen Hargie ed., 2006).
227.
See id. at 74 (discussing connection); Patterson, supra note 224, at 273
(same).
228.
See Ursula Hess & Robert E. Keck, Differentiating Emotion Elicited and
Deliberate Emotional Facial Expressions, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 369, 370 (1990)
(differentiating between body language that is the product of an emotional response
and body language that is the product of a thoughtful response).
229.
See Rosario Montirosso et al., The Development of Dynamic Facial
Expression Recognition at Different Intensities in 4- to 18-Year-Olds, 19 SOC. DEV. 71,
78 (2010) (displaying photographs of facial expression indicating disgust).
230.
Hess & Kleck, supranote 228, at 370; Patterson, supra note 224, at 274.
231.
John A. Bargh, Automatic Information Processing: Implications for
Communication and Affect, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND AFFECT 9, 1112 (Lewis Donohew, Howard E. Sypher & E. Tory Higgins eds., 1988); Gordon,
Druckman, Rozelle & Baxter, supra note 226, at 74.
232.
See Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the
Failure of Self-Restraint, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 571, 600 (2007) ("[Mlost people would not
commit murder even if there were no law against it.").
233.
Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Taking Public Views About Morality and
the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When FormulatingSubstantive Law,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 716 (2000) ("Even if murder were suddenly made legal, most
people would not commit murders because murdering someone would still be contrary
to their own sense of what is right and wrong.").
234.
See Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized
Music Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733, 746 (2005) ("[T]he
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Discussants in Singapore did discuss corruption, articulately and
with much thought. One often-heard comment, which reveals much
about Singaporean attitudes toward corruption, evaluated the job
prospects for a hypothetical Singaporean official dismissed from office
for accepting a bribe. Discussants universally suggested that such a
person would not be able to procure employment in the private sector.
Although all agreed that such a person had acted in an immoral and
illegal manner, that person's inability to find employment did not
seem attributable to a moral judgment by discussants. Instead,
discussants suggested that as a purely objective matter such a person
could not be expected to behave properly, and thus would constitute a
risk to the operability of a private enterprise.
2.

Malaysia

Almost all Malaysian officials also find corruption wrong. The
initial reaction of Malaysian officials, however, differs markedly from
that of Singaporean officials. Malaysian officials do not react in a
visceral manner; rather, their reaction is intellectual. Malaysian
officials respond almost immediately either by noting that corruption
is illegal or with a discussion either of how corruption harms
Malaysia or why government officials yield to the temptation of
corruption.
When asked about corruption, Malaysian officials do not pull
away. Their posture tends to remain constant, or, if corruption is a
subject of particular interest to them, they may lean toward the
interviewer. Discussants who feel that they have seen corruption
damage projects or offices with which they were associated may
initially register disgust with corruption. Those who have spent a
great deal of time thinking about solutions to corruption in Malaysia
may become more and more animated as they expound their solution.
Those who believe that anticorruption efforts have been co-opted as a
political weapon may adopt a cynical, almost slumping posture.
Malaysian officials seem to display thoughtful reactions to
corruption rather than automatic reactions. 235 The interviewer could
discern no nonverbal signals in common among all of the Malaysian
discussants, nor was there a sense that their reactions reflected
deeply embedded respect for law or disgust with the concept of

prohibition against these behaviors is unambiguously internalized in most modern
cultures-obeying the law with regard to murder, for example, has become a part of
most individuals' intrinsic preferences such that they generally heed the prohibition,
independent of the consequences of doing so.").
235.
See Bargh, supra note 231, at 21 (differentiating between reactions).
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corruption. Instead, attitudes toward corruption seem to have been
23 6
learned rather than being embedded.
As with Singaporean discussants, Malaysian discussants spoke
thoughtfully and eloquently about corruption. And as with
Singaporean discussants, one response common among discussants
may reveal underlying attitudes toward corruption and corruption
laws. Malaysian discussants in general condemned corruption. When
asked if they had ever or would ever eat dinner with a person who
accrued wealth through corruption, most respondents indicated that
they had attended such dinners. These respondents reiterated their
criticisms of corruption, but suggested that it would be rude to turn
down such a dinner invitation. When asked about their peers and
colleagues, discussants suggested that dinners with wealthy persons
are attractive, regardless of how that person accumulated wealth.
B. Manifestationof and Experience with Corruption
23 7
Observers often treat corruption as a unitary phenomenon.
Discussants, however, had very different stories regarding their
interactions with corruption.

1.

Singapore

Every discussant in Singapore had definite and comprehensible
feelings about corruption. Other than businesspeople who work
outside of the country, however, relatively few had actual experience
with corruption. 23 8 None of the discussants had paid or received a
bribe in Singapore or had witnessed payment or receipt of a bribe.
In the discussants' opinions, to the extent that corruption exists
in Singapore it mainly occurs in ways that do not directly touch the
lives of most Singaporeans. To the extent that public sector
corruption ever were to occur, most discussants maintained it would

236.
Learned attitudes toward corruption can be useful in controlling
corruption. See generally Esther Hauk & Maria Saez-Marti, On the Cultural
Transmission of Corruption,107 J. ECON. THEORY 311 (2002) (discussing research that
indicates that education plans an important role in disrupting the cultural
transmission of corruption).
237.
See infra notes 323-26 and accompanying text (discussing and providing
examples of the treatment of corruption).
238.
Many discussants who work outside of Singapore reported receiving bribe
requests. In general Singaporeans are reluctant to pay bribes overseas. Transparency
International, which compiles the Corruption Perceptions Index, supra notes 25-27
and accompanying text, also publishes a Bribe Payers Index. In the most recent Briber
Payers Index, posted in 2008, Singaporean businesspeople received a score of 8.1 out of
10.0, indicating little perceived payment of transnational bribes. Press Release,
Transparency Int'l, TI Report: Emerging Economic Giants Show High Levels of
Corporate Bribery Overseas (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.transparency.org/
newsroom/latestnews/pressreleases/2008/bpi_2008_en.
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be most likely to occur in large transactions between foreign
businesses and procuring or licensing agencies in Singapore. Several
discussants pointed to the Siemens prosecution as exemplary of this
type of corruption. 239 Discussants were unable to describe this in a
systematic way; rather, they offered these types of bribes as more
likely to occur than others but had no knowledge or even suspicions of
the actual existence of this type of corruption.
Discussants felt that private sector corruption, although rare,
was more prevalent than public sector corruption. 240 Private sector
nepotism and cronyism figured prominently in these discussions,
kickback and misappropriation less so. 24 1 While most respondents felt
that Singapore remains a place where qualified persons could find
rewarding opportunities, 242 some also felt that relatives of well-placed
business officers were just as likely to find opportunities regardless of

Although it occurred more than a decade earlier, the Siemens case was
239.
surprisingly fresh in the minds of discussants. In 1997 Siemens, as well as BICC
(Britain), Pirelli (Italy), Tomen (Japan), and Marubeni (Japan) were each banned from
government contracts in Singapore for a period of five years because each had been in
involved in the bribery of the Chief Executive of the Public Utility Board (who was
himself sentenced to fifteen years in prison). Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert,
Beyond Compliance: Corruption,CorporateResponsibility and Ethical Standards in the
New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 389, 435 (1997). U.S. and
European authorities investigated Siemens' global activities for more than a decade,
during which time the discussions described in this paper took place. As of the time
this paper was written, Siemens has agreed to pay fines totaling more than one billion
seven hundred million dollars-the largest aggregate fine ever imposed for corrupt
activities. See Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC
and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1682 (2010)
(discussing the Siemens investigation and prosecution); Robert W. Tarun & Peter P.
Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt
PracticesLeniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 161 (2010) (reporting that total
fines levied against Siemens exceeded U.S. $1.7 billion); Matt A. Vega, The SarbanesOxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower
Suits to Overseas Employees, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 448-54 (2009) (discussing U.S
and European prosecution of Siemens).
Just as public corruption consists of use or misuse of public office or trust
240.
for personal rather than public benefit, private sector corruption consists of the abuse
or misuse of a privately conferred relationship for personal benefit rather than the
purpose for which the relationship was created. See James P. Wesberry, Jr.,
InternationalFinancialInstitutions Face the Corruption Eruption:If the IFIs Put Their
Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be Capped, 18
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 498, 508 (1998) (describing private sector corruption).
241.
Cronyism refers to limiting business relationships to or giving preferences
to members of a preconfigured group with pre-existing relationships. Nepotism refers
to awarding positions within an organization on the basis of affinity rather than merit.
The term "kickbacks" describes private sector bribes, usually paid to purchasing agents
in return for purchase of the bribe-payers products or services. Misappropriation refers
to illicit obtainment of an organization's property, for example through theft or
embezzlement.
242.
Within the public sector, meritocracy is a core principal that is virtually
never violated. See Thomas J. Bellows, Meritocracy and the SingaporePoliticalSystem,
17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 22, 31 (2009) (describing the institutionalization of meritocracy in
Singapore).
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their personal qualifications. Some discussants also suggested that
business relationships in Singapore were increasingly based on
reciprocity rather than business sense.
Mention of reciprocity in an East Asian context inevitably leads
to discussions of guanxi. Guanxi denotes institutionalized networks of
"relationships that include mutual obligation, reciprocity, goodwill
and personal affection." 243 Guanxi, therefore, consists of the same
type of networking practiced by businesspeople in almost every
culture. 24 4 Commentators from outside Chinese cultures, however,
frequently distill the complexity of Chinese social phenomenon into a
stylized conception of guanxi, and treat that conception as something
24 5
foreign and somewhat distasteful.
No Singaporean discussant initiated conversations regarding
guanxi. When guanxi was mentioned, discussants understood the
concept (to a greater extent than the interviewer) and discussed it
with great facility. Discussants did not, however, conflate guanxi with
corruption, nor did they consider guanxi to involve undue reciprocity.
Rather, when voicing concerns regarding reciprocity in the business
environment in Singapore, some discussants opined that observed
exchanges of business favors did not comport with Singapore's
emphasis on merit-based business decisions. 246 Singapore, it should
247
be noted, does not have a reputation for cronyism.
Petty corruption plays almost no role in the lives of the
discussants. 248 None of the discussants had ever paid a bribe to a
police officer, or to a customs officer, or any licensing agency, or for

243.
Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the
Emperor Is Far Away: The Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 484
(2003).
244.
See Steven R. Salbu, ExtraterritorialRestriction of Bribery: A Premature
Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 250 (1999)
(describing guanxi as "China's analogue to American networking"); Frank K. Upham,
Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114
YALE L.J. 1675, 1678 n.2 (2005) ("Guanxi essentially means the use of interpersonal
relationships for personal or institutional advantage. As such, it exists
everywhere ....").
245.
See Pattison & Herron, supra note 243, at 484 (noting that outsiders often
mischaracterize guanxi as "no more than cronyism tainted by bribery and corruption");
Upham, supra note 244, at 1677-78 (dismissing Western overreliance on the concept of
guanxi as essentializing complex social phenomena in China).
246.
See Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example,
41 MCGILL L.J. 743, 773 (1996) ("Singapore has entrenched the belief in equality and
fairness of opportunity, called 'meritocracy."'); see also Hilary Hardcastle, Minority
Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 35 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 298, 298 (2007)
(contrasting Singapore's meritocracy with Malaysia's preferences for native
Malaysians).
247.
See Linda Low, Book Review, 24 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 282, 284 (2007)
(contrasting Singapore with Indonesia and Malaysia).
248.
Petty corruption refers to small bribes paid for basic services or to avoid
small fines. See Earle & Cava, supra note 25, at 79-80 (discussing definitions of petty
corruption).
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the purpose of expediting any action by a government official in
Singapore. Almost all respondents were aware of petty corruption in
other countries in the region, but reported that Singapore is
substantially different in that respect. Some discussants suggested
that petty corruption (or perhaps systematic corruption) occurs in the
prostitution industry in areas such as Geylang; 249 discussants noted
that this was mere speculation on their part and that they had no
first-hand knowledge.2 50 When pressed, none could explain their
impression that corruption might occur in that industry other than as
a vague impression that some activities in the prostitution industry
25 1
are hidden from general view.
Singaporean discussants interacted with corruption at a
distance. All were aware of corruption, but few had actual experience
with corruption. 252 The fact that they interacted with corruption from
a distance, however, did not dilute their attitudes toward the
phenomenon. All respondents expressed very strong negative feelings
about corruption.
2.

Malaysia

Malaysian discussants were much more open and at times
voluble about interactions with corruption. The majority of
discussants claimed first-hand knowledge of corruption. Most claimed
to have paid bribes, most claimed to have witnessed the payment of
bribes, and some discussants indicated a willingness to accept bribes.
Malaysian discussants suggested that bribery touches people's
lives both directly and indirectly. As in the case of Singapore,
Malaysian discussants suggested the existence of corruption in large
transactions. Malaysian discussants, however, felt that bribery in
such transactions may be somewhat regular; moreover, they

249.
Licensed and monitored prostitution is legal in Singapore; procurement,
solicitation, transportation of persons for purposes of prostitution, and unlicensed
prostitution are felonies. Penal Code, 1871, c. 224, §§ 373-373A (Sing.).
250.
The author could not find persons involved in the prostitution industry
willing to engage in discussions of corruption. Two daytime walks through Geylang
working on unproductive leads revealed activities that on the surface appeared
questionable. For thorough discussions of this industry, see James Francis Warren,
Chinese Prostitution in Singapore: Recruitment and Brothel Organisation, in WOMEN
AND CHINESE PATRIARCHY: SUBMISSION, SERVITUDE, AND ESCAPE 77-107 (Maria
Jaschok & Suzanne Miers eds., 1994); Yang Joel Wong, Brothels, Pimps and
Prostitutes: The Administration of Criminal Justice vis-A-vis Prostitution, 17 SING. L.
REV. 154 (1996) (discussing Singaporean law and police enforcement regarding
prostitution).
251.
Interestingly, these observations resonate with Robert Klitgaard's
suggestion that an abundance of precise record keeping contributes to Singapore's
success in controlling corruption; these records expose illicit activity to enforcer's
scrutiny. KLITGAARD, supra note 205, at 127.
252.
Those who experienced corruption did so outside of Singapore.
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suggested that Malaysian as well as foreign businesses could be
involved. Interestingly, almost all discussants considered large scale
bribery harmful, and specifically listed among the potential harms
that such corruption renders Malaysia less desirable as a destination
for foreign investors.
Malaysian discussants described systemic corruption in which
businesspeople could expect bribe requests of regular sizes for
procurement contracts and for service contracts, and bribe requests of
regular but larger size for construction contracts. Most discussants,
particularly outside of the capital city Kuala Lumpur, felt that bribe
requests were more likely in regional governments. Several
discussants pointed to the evasion of environmental regulation as a
253
frequent objective of bribery.
In addition to bribery, some discussants opined that government
officials, and in particular local government officials, collude with
private business to exploit resources or markets for their personal
benefit. Discussants speculated that looting of public office occurs,
although most suggested that if it occurs it does so with far less
frequency than in the past. Discussants had a variety of opinions
regarding nepotism in public offices: some suggested that nepotism
occurs with some frequency while others suggested that Malaysia's
rules regarding cultural and ethnic diversity render nepotism
difficult.
Discussant's conversations regarding private sector corruption
were interesting but somewhat poorly informed. Discussants had a
range of opinions regarding the competency of Malaysian
businesses, 2 54 but to the extent that opinions converged, they
converged on a less than favorable opinion. Discussants often
confused perceived incompetence with corruption. 255 Corruption is
the abuse or misuse of trust for personal gain rather than the benefit
of the parties granting that trust.256 To include every undesirable
behavior within the rubric of corruption dilutes the meaning of the
word "corruption" and makes focused analysis more difficult. Indeed,
Malaysian discussants at times seemed to discuss levels of trust

253.
See Julia Amrock, Note, Challenges for Private Sector Conservation:
Sanderson'sThe Future of Conservation in Tierra del Fuego, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 595, 601 (2006) (noting a relationship between corruption and environmental
degradation in developing countries).
254.
Businesspeople shared in the breadth of opinion.
255.
The author has frequently observed the confusion of corruption with any
undesirable conduct in interviews conducted around the world. See Debbie Orpin,
Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis: Examining the Ideology of Sleaze,
10 INT'L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 37, 51 (2005) (finding that "incompetence,"
"inefficiency," and "mismanagement" are lexical collates of "corruption").
256.
ASIAN DEv. BANK, ANTICORRUPTION: OUR POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 9 (2000),
available at http://www.adb.orglDocuments[Policies/Anticorruptionanticorruption.pdf; see
Nye, supra note 65, at 419 n.10.
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rather than levels of corruption: Malaysian businesspeople appeared
257
to distrust business in general.
In general, discussants had positive attitudes toward individual
government officials in Malaysia; negative attitudes were often
associated with petty corruption. 25 8 Discussants emphasized that
corrupt behaviors are not universal and often excused corrupt
behaviors by explaining that government officials do not receive
adequate salaries, 259 or that they are under pressure from peers or
superiors to demand or accept bribes. At the same time, discussants
explained that this corruption did have an effect on the manner in
which discussants conduct business. Most discussants attempted to
avoid reliance on government institutions to the extent possible. In
this, discussants reflected the disengagement predicted by Susan
26 0
Rose-Ackerman and others.
Many discussants from business sectors also explained-usually
emphatically-that in operating their businesses they preferred to
limit business relationships to persons well known by or somehow
affined to themselves. When presented with a hypothetical business
relationship with a stranger that could be beneficial, respondents
usually asked whether the hypothetical stranger was Malaysian or
foreign. 26 1 If told the stranger was Malaysian, discussants usually
then talked about the risks associated with entering into business
relationships with strangers. It was not clear that these discussants
had created parallel institutions to support their affined

257.
Frank Cross observes that, "Trust is surely important for reasons beyond
the mere economic. It is regarded as 'one essential source of social order."' Frank B.
Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1481 (2005) (quoting BERNARD BARBER, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 166 (1983)). Cross further explains:
Comparative studies have found that generalized trust of other people is 'an
important correlate of stable democratic government.' Internationally, higher
trust is associated 'with higher ratings on subjective measures of governmental
efficiency, corruption, and infrastructure quality.' Another study found that
trust was associated with less corruption, bureaucratic quality, tax compliance,
civic participation, and better education.
Id. (citations omitted).
258.
See discussion infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
259.
Jeremy Pope vehemently denies a connection between low government
salaries and corruption. See JEREMY POPE, CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS
OF
A
NATIONAL
INTEGRITY
SYSTEM
9-10
(2000),
available
at

http://www.transparency.org/sourcebooklindex.html (describing the common wisdom
that low salaries cause corruption as a "myth" and stating that "the evidence is all to
the contrary"). Pope points out that some wealthy countries experience serious
corruption, and equates linkages between income and corruption "as being little short
of a blanket defamation of the poor." Id. at 7.
260.
See supra note 87.
261.
If told the stranger was foreign, discussants asked more questions that,
without using this terminology, attempted to assess the institutions that might support
a relationship with that stranger.
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relationships. 26 2 Rather, discussants spoke of the importance of
knowing how someone would behave, the quality of trustworthiness,
and the importance to their own businesses of having a good
reputation among friends and colleagues.
Malaysian discussants believed that petty corruption pervades
Malaysia. Discussants reported petty corruption throughout the
nation-in interactions with police, licensing agencies, low level
bureaucracies, and education. Discussants did not describe petty
corruption as ubiquitous-they did not believe that all or even most
interactions involved corruption; rather, they believed in or had
experienced the occurrence of petty corruption on occasion in a
variety of different transactions.
With respect to petty corruption, discussants exhibited a
contemptuous attitude toward government officials. One sample bias
in this study involves the income level of discussants-none of the
discussants experience poverty. 263 Thus the discussants could easily
satisfy requests for petty bribes. Almost all discussants, however,
found requests for petty bribes annoying rather than convenient.
Discussants felt that petty bribery degrades government services, and
many voiced suspicions that bureaucrats created artificial delays for
264
the purpose of demanding petty bribes.
Government officials openly discussed the existence of petty
corruption. Officials realized the danger posed to Malaysia by petty
corruption, and expressed a desire to curb or eliminate the practice.
Some explained the existence of petty corruption as a result of
proximity to countries in which corruption runs rampant, and some
attributed petty corruption to the difficulty in controlling dispersed
265
local governments within a federal system.
Discussants voiced concern over the danger posed to Malaysia by
corruption in general. At the same time, discussants expressed pride
in Malaysia and in the degree to which it has controlled corruption.
Discussants rarely mentioned Singapore, but made frequent
reference to endemic corruption in other Southeast Asian countries.

262.
See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing parallel
institutions).
Fewer than 6 percent of Malaysians live below the poverty line. The World
263.
Factbook:Malaysia, supra note 114.
264.
See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
corruption on government services).
265.
Malaysia consists of thirteen states and one federal territory. Nine of the
federal states have hereditary rulers, four have governors appointed by the federal
government. The two states on the island of Borneo-Sabah and Sarawak-which
joined Malaysia more as a function of British colonial occupation and administration
than through cultural or historical affinity, maintain distinct rights, such as control of
immigration. The World Factbook: Malaysia, supra note 114; see supra notes 138-42
and accompanying text (discussing political history of Malaysia).
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Compared to these neighbors, discussants argued, Malaysia should be
perceived as a well-governed state.
C. Responses to CorruptionAgencies
As discussed above, Malaysia and Singapore have each created
semi-independent agencies to investigate allegations or complaints of
corruption and to recommend prosecution of those found engaging in
corruption. 266 While the agencies exhibit many similarities, reaction
to those agencies differs.
1.

Singapore

Discussants expressed confidence in the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau. Discussants described the CPIB as generally
fair and quite scrupulous in its activities. No discussants claimed that
267
the CPIB acts as a tool of the party in control of the government;
nor did any claim that it acted in an impartial manner. Discussants
did not hail the CPIB as a savior of Singapore, 268 probably because
corruption does not threaten Singapore as it does other countries in
Southeast Asia. 269 Rather, discussants seemed to consider the CPIB
as a competent, noncontroversial agency that functions as well as
other agencies in the government.
Discussants generally reported a belief that corrupt acts would
be discovered and corrupt actors prosecuted. When discussing their
own behavior, however, the possibility of detection and prosecution
did not play a major role. Compliance with laws regarding corruption
seemed to be assumed; discussants did not volunteer explanations of
their behavior. When asked, businesspeople generally offered a threepronged answer. First, they responded that bribery was not part of
the Singaporean manner of conducting business. Second,
businesspeople opined that the offer of a bribe could not be kept
secret and would seriously damage their reputation and standing in
the community. Third, they pointed out that a bribe offer would have

266.
Supra notes 184-90, 194-204 and accompanying text.
267.
Although the People's Action Party has controlled the government since
Singapore acquired self-rule, Singapore does enjoys a multiparty democracy. The World
Factbook:Malaysia, supra note 114.
268.
Contra KLITGAARD, supra note 205, at 126 (crediting the CPIB with a
"dramatic turnaround" in Singapore).
269.
Interestingly, persons outside of Singapore heap far more approbation on
the CPIB than do the discussants inside Singapore. See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs &
Benjamin B. Wagner, Limits to the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission Model of
Corruption Reform: Lessons from Indonesia, 20 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv.

L.J. 327, 328 (2007) (noting that both the ICAC and the CPIB are "widely hailed as
success stories"); Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 197, at 782 (stating that the CPIB
has "been critical to the development of Singapore").
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little effect, because government officials would be extremely unlikely
to accept. Somewhat jokingly, a few discussants suggested that at
most a bribe offer would place them in front of the CPIB.
2.

Malaysia

Discussants in Malaysia held generally unfavorable opinions of
the Anti-Corruption Agency. The Agency was often described as
toothless. Discussants complained that the Agency pursued only ikan
bilis-small fish-and did not pursue serious corruption committed
by senior government officials or wealthy businesspeople. 270 Many
people construed the failure to prosecute senior officials as evidence
that the ACA was a tool of the ruling political coalition rather than an
independent body. 271

The attitudes of discussants presented an interesting
conundrum. On the one hand, discussants disapproved of corruption,
found corruption harmful, desired an active program to combat
corruption, and felt genuine pride in Malaysia's successes in
controlling corruption. On the other hand, discussants reported
skepticism about the agency tasked with combating corruption and
expressed little desire to cooperate with that agency. To cooperate
with the agency was perceived by some discussants as complicity with
selective prosecution aimed at consolidating political power rather
than impartially combating corruption.
Paradoxically, the ACA was mentioned when discussants
explained their own behavior. Even discussants who described the
ACA as toothless expressed concern that corrupt behavior might be
detected and investigated by the ACA. That concern was not
expressed as a certainty, but instead as a possibility. Discussants
uniformly expressed a belief that investigation by the ACA would be
burdensome; none expressed any confidence that they could use
connections or bribes to influence the ACA. Others, they believed,
could do so, but not themselves.
Potential investigation by the ACA was not the only factor that
discussants reported as influencing their behavior with respect to
corruption. Those who did not engage in corruption referred to the
harms that corruption could inflict on Malaysia; more than half of
this subgroup also expressed solidarity with national movements to

270.
Cf. Milne, supra note 156, at 57 (reporting that the ACA had a reputation
for not going after "big fish").
271.
Malaysia has an active democratic government. The federal government,
however, has been controlled by the same political coalition, the United Malays
National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu), since Malaysia
obtained independence from British occupation in 1957. The World Factbook, supra
note 114.
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control corruption. A handful of discussants also mentioned concern
about the effect corruption would have on their reputations.
Government officials mentioned the ACA somewhat less when
discussing their own behaviors. Those who engaged in corruption
expressed doubt that the ACA would concern itself with their
activities. On the other hand, those who did not engage in corruption
generally believed that the ACA could discover corrupt activities and
that prosecution would ensue. More frequently, however, those
discussants that did not engage in corruption referred to
professionalism, self-respect, and their responsibility to conduct
themselves in a manner that inured to the benefit of Malaysia.

IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRUPTION LAWS

The interviews described in this paper do not produce large sets
of data that can be employed to find the broad shapes of corruption in
Singapore and Malaysia. The interviews do, however, shed light on
aspects of corruption in these countries that quantitative studies
might not initially discover. These insights, in turn, suggest areas in
which scholars and policymakers might focus more attention. In
particular, the discussions indicate that the psychic costs associated
with a corrupt act may be greater in Singapore. The discussions also
highlight the fact that corruption is not a unitary phenomenon. On a
positive note, the discussions serve as a reminder that legal regimes
can effectively control corruption.
A. Internalizationof Corruption Controls
Why does Singapore succeed at controlling corruption? Many
272
theories attempt to explain crime and thus the means of its control.
Robert Lilly, Francis Cullen, and Richard Ball point out, however,
that these theories simply predict whether people are more likely to
commit more crime. 273 They observe that:
[I]n the end, crime is not simply due to underlying motivations or
dispositions; it also involves a concrete choice-or, in fact a sequence of
choices-that must be made if these motivations are to result in an
2 74
actual criminal act.

A different way to ask the same question, therefore, would be: why do
fewer people in Singapore choose to act corruptly? The discussions

272.
Several of these theories are explained in FREDA ADLER, GERHARD 0. W.
MUELLER & WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CRIMINOLOGY 85-223 (6th ed. 2007).
273.
J. ROBERT LILLY, FRANCIS T. CULLEN & RICHARD A. BALL, CRIMINOLOGICAL
THEORY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 341-42 (5th ed. 2011).
274.
Id. at 341.
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described in this paper may provide some insight. That insight
involves psychic costs, which must be placed in the context of a theory
regarding an individual decision to violate legal rules.
Gary Becker offers a rational choice theory to explain that
decision. 275 Becker suggests that people consciously or unconsciously
evaluate the potential costs and the potential gains before deciding to
commit a crime. 276 This, of course, is not always true: some crimes

are the result of blind passion or impulse, some crimes result from
negligence or recklessness. 277 Moreover, each individual's choices
occur within complex social structures that involve factors well
outside of that individual's control. 278 Becker's insight should never
be interpreted as a complete explanation of criminal behavior.
Empirical research, however, indicates that for great numbers of
2 79
criminal actors Becker's observation has a great deal of relevance.
This is particularly true with respect to "white collar" crimes such as
280
corruption, and in particular the acceptance of a bribe.

275.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); see Joanna Shepherd, Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing
Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 544 (2007)
(describing Becker's method as "one of the primary models for analyzing criminal
behavior").
276.
Becker, supranote 275, at 178. Becker suggested that the number of crimes
a person would commit-Oj-is equal to Oj(pjfjuj), where "pj [is] his probability of
conviction per offense, fj his punishment per offense, and uj a portmanteau variable
representing all these other influences." Id. at 177.
277.
See Charles H. Whitebread & John Heilman, Increasing Our Effectiveness
Against Crime: Expanding the Limits of Law Enforcement, 93 YALE L.J. 1399, 1412
n.75 (1984) (discussing crimes committed in "the heat of passion"); Recent Case, United
States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 760, 763 (2010) ("[A]
crime with a mens rea of recklessness does not involve purposeful conduct."). Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen point also out that
criminals may not actually reason as in the economic model, but they may act
as if they had. By saying that criminals act 'as if they had deliberated, we
mean that, when presented with the opportunity to commit crimes, they
respond immediately to benefits and risks as if they had weighed them.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 442 (2003).
278.
See LILLY, CULLEN & BALL, supra note 273, at 289 (discussing the
complexity of attempting this calculation and the numerous influences not accounted
for).
279.
See Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of
Theory and Evidence, 41 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 301 (1988) (surveying
empirical tests of models based on Becker's observations); Shepherd, supra note 275, at
545 (discussing the explanatory power of Becker's model).
280.
Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to
Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
549 (1996); see Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and
White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 290 (2007) ("White-collar
offenses are not generally crimes of passion."); see also Paul B. Stephan, Rationality
and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 533, 538 (1999)
(stating that these theories apply to corruption). Becker himself applied his model to
police misconduct, including corruption. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law
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Jin-Wook Choi utilizes the rational choice perspective in his
comparison of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against
Corruption and Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau. 28 1 He suggests an individual decision about corruption can
be depicted as
Utility = Benefit- p(Detection) x Sanction
and explains that "[t]his equation implies that individual utility is
determined by the expected benefits from corruption and disutility
from the probability of being caught multiplied by the severity of
ensuing sanctions. ' 28 2 Choi's description of the decision to violate
corruption laws falls into a category that Lilly, Cullen, and Ball
describe as "crass. ' 283 This category of rational choice descriptions
takes into consideration only the expected benefits and punishments,
whereas in reality an actor takes into account "formal, informal, and
self-imposed costs.

'2 8 4

A somewhat more accurate depiction of the decision to act
28 5
corruptly takes into account those and other costs:
Utility = fBenefits - ((p*Criminal Penalties) +

f(p*Social Penalties) + Cost of Favor + Psychic Costs)
This depiction takes into account the value of the offered benefit, but
recognizes that the value to the offeree is a function of, among other
things, the extent to which the bribe can be used-even a very large
bribe is of no value if it cannot be used in secrecy. 28 6 Singapore has

Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1
(1974); see Rafael di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, The Role of Wages and Auditing
During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires, 46 J.L. & ECON. 269
(2003) (using Becker and Stigler's analysis to evaluate efforts to reduce police
corruption in Argentina).
281.
Jin-Wook Choi, Institutional Structures and Effectiveness of Anticorruption
Agencies: A ComparativeAnalysis of South Korea and Hong Kong, 17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI.
195 (2009).
282.
Id. at 197.
283.
LILLY, CULLEN & BALL, supra note 273, at 289.
284.
See id. (describing other factors and noting that "people do not arrive at a
point of decision as empty vessels devoid of all morality").
285.
A version of this depiction is put forward and explained at length in Philip
M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the
Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature,
48 AM. Bus. L.J. 77, 100-09 (2011).
286.
If government officials accept bribes publicly, the parties face
imprisonment. See DAVID CHAIKIN & J. C. SHARMAN, CORRUPTION AND MONEY
LAUNDERING 23 (2009) (discussing the need for bribe recipients to launder their money
so that the money can be used). Chaikin and Sharman note that "corruption and money
laundering are symbiotic." Id. at 1. Secret Swiss bank accounts are more than
glamorous; they also make possible the laundering and subsequent use of large

196

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45145

been used in the past to hide illicit funds;28 7 the extensive
recordkeeping inherent to Singapore, however, could make the
transfer of illicit funds difficult. 288 Because no Singaporean
discussant had experience accepting bribes, conversations with those
discussants did not reveal how bribes are accepted or used. Malaysian
28 9
discussants simply referred to offshore accounts.
This depiction also takes into account the perceived risk of
detection and subsequent criminal penalties. Perceived risk of
detection and prosecution actually has more impact on the actor's
decision than does the bare-boned "probability" to which the crass
depiction refers. 290 Discussants from both Singapore and Malaysia
29
believed that corrupt activities could be detected and prosecuted. '
Discussants from Singapore, however, expressed far greater respect
for the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau than did Malaysian
discussants for the Anti-Corruption Agency. 292 That respect
undoubtedly plays a role in controlling corruption in Singapore by
increasing the perceived costs when an actor contemplates a corrupt
act.
Costs imposed by the criminal law do not consist only of
incarceration or fines. This depiction recognizes that the cost borne by
the offeree is affected by many factors, including the likelihood of
prosecution, expenses incurred by mounting a defense, the mental
and physical tolls associated with criminal litigation, and time lost

amounts of money. See Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and
Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 903 n.127 (2000) (noting that money accrued through
corruption flows into secret Swiss bank accounts rather than into productive domestic
uses).
287.
See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt PracticesLaw, 32
MICH. J. INT'L L. 129, 137 (2010) (describing flow of illegal money from Bangladesh).
288.
See KLITGAARD, supra note 205, at 127 (discussing recordkeeping).
289.
The fact that all of the Malaysian discussants referred to bribes in the form
of currency-and then almost always in the form of Malaysian ringgits-is of some
interest. Bribes occur in many forms: "The bribe may be anything having monetary
value, including cash, liquor, lottery chances, and welfare benefits such as food
stamps." CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 47 (7th rev. ed. 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/electbook-rvsO8O7.pdf. Indeed, one of the most
common forms of bribe that the author has encountered takes the form of college
tuition for the bribe recipient's children. See Anand Giridharadas, Indian to the Core,
and an Oligarch, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at B1 (describing forms of bribery
including paying college tuition for bureaucrats' children); Michael Janofsky, Court
Asked to Revive Case Against 2 in Salt Lake City Bid Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2002, at D1 (discussing bribes that were paid to Olympic Committee members by Salt
Lake City, including U.S. college admission and tuition).
290.
See Carol A. Heimer, Social Structure, Psychology, and the Estimation of
Risk, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 491 (1988) (explaining that actors make evaluations based on
their perceptions rather than the objective probability).
291.
See supra Part IV.C. 1-2.
292.
See supra Part IV.C. 1-2.
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from family and friends and other opportunity costs incurred while
incarcerated. 293 Interestingly, conversations with discussants from
Singapore revealed concerns about these costs: Singaporean
discussants expressed concern that dismissal from government
positions on grounds of corrupt activity would render them
294
unemployable in the private sector.
This depiction takes into account costs not represented in the
"crass" model. Corruption will evoke social costs, which a rational
2 95
decision maker will discount by the probability of social detection.
Social detection differs from detection by law enforcement agents;
one's neighbors may know what the police do not. Social costs include
the informal penalties imposed by society in general, usually in the
form of reputation and shame. 296 These penalties play a powerful role
in controlling compliance with legal regimes: "the real power to gain
compliance with society's rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the
threat or reality of official criminal sanction, but in ...[t]he networks
of interpersonal relationships in which people find themselves, [and]
the social norms
and prohibitions shared among those
relationships. '297 Discussants from both Singapore and Malaysia held
corruption in contempt, but conversations with discussants revealed
one way in which social costs in Singapore may be higher than in
Malaysia. Malaysian discussants happily dine with those whom they
strongly suspect of corruption, and even accord a degree of respect to

293.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 595, 605 n.47 (1993) (discussing the costs associated with the criminal process);
Shepherd, supra note 275, at 545-46 (discussing many costs, including some imposed
by the criminal process).
294.
See Becker & Stigler, supra note 280, at 1-18 (discussing opportunity costs
of criminal acts).
295.
See Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of
Globalization,91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 536 (2006) (discussing social costs including shame
and social censure); Elizabeth Spahn, InternationalBribery: The Moral Imperialism
Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 155, 179 (2009) (noting that corruption is universally
condemned).
296. Ronet Bachman, Raymond Paternoster & Sally Ward, The Rationality of
Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/RationalChoice Conception of Sexual Assault,
26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 343, 355 (1992); Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime
and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 536 (2006); see ADLER,
MUELLER & LAUFER, supra note 272, at 168 (stating that social controls include "laws,
norms, customs, mores, ethics, and etiquette").
297.
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 457 (1997); see Alessandro Balestrino, It Is a Theft but Not a Crime, 24 EUR.
J. POL. ECON. 455, 456 (2008) ("A commonly advocated explanation for apparent
deviations from rational behaviour is the existence of social norms that imply a stigma
for those who do not adhere to them. For example, dodging taxes may be quite
lucrative, and still many people may refrain from it because of the psychic costs
associated with violating a custom that condemns such instances of anti-social
behaviour.").
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such persons because of their wealth. 298 The absence of social
consequences reduces the social costs associated with violation of
299

corruption rules.
A potential bribe-taker must take into consideration the cost of
the performance that is required as quid pro quo for the bribe. 300 This
is not an inconsequential cost: arguably, for example, the great ease
with which an individual U.S. legislator can direct funds to an
individual project has contributed to corruption in the U.S.
legislature. 30 1 Malaysian discussants alluded to these costs in
referring to the difficulty of controlling corruption in a decentralized
system and in opining that more corruption occurs away from the
30 2
central administration than within it.
This depiction also takes into account psychic costs. 303 Psychic
costs accrue from emotional, psychological, and other internal
factors. 30 4 Whereas violation of social controls provokes reputational

298.
In conversations that the author had with a group of Pakistani
businesspeople, those businesspeople discussed the same phenomenon in Pakistan,
which they referred to as the "big man syndrome." These businesspeople very
perceptively suggested that the big man syndrome makes corruption control more
difficult in Pakistan, because even though corruption is roundly condemned, corrupt
actors bear little real social condemnation for their actions. Other legal scholars have
reported on similar "big man" issues in the application of law. See Vivek Maru, Between
Law and Society: Paralegalsand the Provision of Justice Services in Sierra Leone and
Worldwide, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 434-35 (2006) (discussing the difficulty of
prosecuting "big men" in Sierra Leone); Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell,
Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323, 352 (1993)
(discussing the role of "big men" in Romani law).
299.
See Marta OrviskA, Anetta CapldnovA, Jozef Medved & John Hudson, A
Cross-Section Approach to Measuring the Shadow Economy, 28 J. POL'Y MODELING
713, 721 (2006) (noting that the extent to which social stigma deters illicit behavior
"depends upon the attitude of the community itself").
300.
See Shepherd, supra note 275, at 544-45 (discussing the "direct costs" of a
decision to commit a crime).
301.
Legislators can direct funds through the process of "earmarking," a process
that allows a single legislator to insert spending directions into general spending bills
with no oversight and almost no debate. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:
Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation,94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 542-51 (2009)
(describing a multitude of ways in which transparency rules governing earmarking are
evaded by legislators); Thomas M. Susman & Margaret H. Martin, Contingent Fee
Lobbying: Inflaming Avarice or FacilitatingConstitutional Rights?, 31 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 311, 343 (2007) (noting that earmarking "has been subject to strong
condemnation for providing a fertile breeding ground for both congressional and
lobbyist corruption").
302.
Other observations of Malaysian respondents are reported supra Part
IV.B.2.
303.
See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, To Serve and Collect: Measuring Police
Corruption, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 599 (2003) (stating that a rational
actor considers psychic costs when contemplating whether to act corruptly).
304.
See ADLER, MUELLER & LAUFER, supra note 272, at 168 (describing sources
of internal costs); see also Reza Fadaei-Tehrani & Thomas M. Green, Crime and
Society, 29 INT'L J. Soc. ECON. 781, 784 (2002) ("[E]conomists agree that the gains and
costs of criminal behavior include psychic elements. These psychic costs and benefits
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shame, violation of these internal rules evokes personal feelings of
required to
guilt. 30 5 One very important psychic cost is the effort
306
law.
the
of
violation
to
barriers
internal
these
overcome
Empirical evaluation of psychic costs is difficult because
30 7
determining the existence of these barriers is difficult.
Nonetheless, psychic costs are recognized as having powerful
influence on an individual's decisions regarding compliance with
law.3 0 8 In reviewing empirical studies of crime, Lilly, Cullen, and Ball
observe that "[m]orality appears to be the strongest predictor of the
willingness to offend. 30 s
Internal barriers to criminal behavior obviously have a close
relationship to social rules and norms, because those rules and norms
often serve as the source of internal attitudes toward a criminal
action. 310 Katharine Baker describes this relationship as an
of external legal proscription[s]. '' 311 The
"internalize[ation]
discussions reported in this paper suggest that Singaporeans have
internalized laws regarding corruption to a far greater extent than
have Malaysian discussants. Accordingly, psychic costs are higher for

become a net for all kinds of psychological, sociological, and political phenomena."). See
generally Jack P. Gibbs, Social Control, Deterrence, and Perspectives on Social Order,
56 Soc. FORCES 408 (1977) (discussing importance and variety of controls in personal
decisions about crime).
Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others,
305.
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 837, 840
(1990).

See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
306.
REV. 1697, 1729 (1996) ("The amount of psychic cost depends on the kind and intensity
of moral values held by observers.").
See John A. Bargh & Kimberly Barndollar, Automaticity in Action: The
307.
Unconscious as Repository of Chronic Goals and Motive, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ACTION: LINKING COGNITION AND MOTIVATION TO BEHAVIOR 457, 459 (Peter M.

Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh eds., 1995) (describing difficulties of empirical research
and techniques for discerning internal controls).
308.
See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 680
(1999) ("People obey the law because they internalize the external legal proscription.").
309.
LILLY, CULLEN & BALL, supra note 273, at 289-90; see JOHN BRATHWAITE,
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 71 (1989) ("[C]onscience is a much more powerful

weapon to control misbehavior than punishment.").
Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum explain that "[i]ndividuals thus refrain
310.
from criminality not because they fear the threatened punishment but because they
have no desire to engage in such behavior; and they have no desire to engage in such
behavior because they know it is deemed worthy of criminal punishment." Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 356 (1996); see J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual
Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and InstitutionalBarriersto Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE
L.J. 604, 644 (1985) ("An individual's culture provides him or her with psychic rewards
for conforming his or her behavior to cultural norms and with psychic costs for doing
otherwise, and this psychic calculus takes on a social dimension through communal
action: acceptance and praise for appropriate behavior, rejection and scorn for any
deviation.").
Baker, supra note 308, at 680.
311.
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Singaporean officials, which almost certainly contributes to the
greater reluctance of Singaporean officials to demand or accept
bribes.
B. CorruptionIs Not Monolithic
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in
particular, and quantitative measures of corruption in general, have
revolutionized the study of corruption and have engendered a
plenitude of quantitative studies of corruption. 312 These indexes
deserve substantial respect for their contributions to the general
understanding of corruption. 313 Conversations with Singaporean and
Malaysian discussants, however, suggest a serious limitation to the
utility of these indexes: these indexes treat corruption as a
monolithic, linear phenomenon, whereas discussants in each of the
countries experienced corruption in a different manner. Corruption
had little direct interaction with the lives of Singaporean discussants,
but did constitute a regularly encountered feature for most Malaysian
discussants.3 14 The indexes do not account for these, or any,
differences in how corruption manifests itself.
Other fieldwork conducted by the author of this paper supports
this observation. The author of this paper has conducted extensive
fieldwork on corruption in the countries of Kazakhstan and
Mongolia. 315 The two countries receive very close scores, of 2.9 and
2.7, in the Corruption Perceptions Index.31 6 Yet corruption manifests
itself differently in each country. Grand corruption 3 17 in Mongolia

312.
E.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests:
International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141,
S165 n.58 (2002) ("By establishing the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index in
July 1995, [Transparency International] helped focus global public attention on
corruption; this translated into support for restrictions on transnational bribery.");
Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of
Transparency International'sApproach to Measuring Corruption, 57 POL. STUD. 746,
747 (2009) (characterizing the Corruption Perceptions Index as "most influential" and
"immensely important" and noting that the Index "offer[s] for the first time a
systematic basis on which to compare perceptions of corruption across a range of
different countries ....
[without which] it is doubtful whether many secondary studies
which seek to identify the causes of corruption would have been undertaken").
313.
See Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The
1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward
Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 494 n.55 (2000) (lauding
the Corruption Perceptions Index ).
314.
See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
315.
See Nichols, supra note 6, at 915-45 (discussing results of fieldwork in
Kazakhstan); Nichols, Siedel & Kasdin, supra note 6, at 215-56 (comparing findings of
author's fieldwork in Mongolia with findings of co-authors' fieldwork in Romania).
Corruption PerceptionsIndex 2010 Results, supra note 28.
316.
317.
"Grand corruption" consists of large payments made to politicians or
bureaucrats with the power to make or influence discretionary decisions, usually for
large projects or procurements. Ala'i, supra note 286, 930 n.268.
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reflects the contest for power between Mongolia's two neighbors:
informants allege that Chinese interests pay block bribes to the
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which then divides the
money among MPRP politicians who are expected to act in favor of
those interests. Informants allege that Russian interests, on the other
hand, pay bribes to specific politicians, usually members of the
Democratic Party, in exchange for favorable treatment in specific
actions or approvals. Grand corruption in Kazakhstan tends to be
bureaucratized and hierarchical. 318 Bribery is one of the main issues
of concern in Mongolia, while Kazakhstani tend to worry about theft
by government actors and the relationship between government and
organized crime. 319 The countries receive nearly the same score in the
Corruption Perceptions Index, and may therefore be perceived to
experience nearly the same raw amount of corruption. In reality,
corruption manifests itself quite differently in each country.
The admonition that similar scores on corruption indexes can
represent different manifestations of corruption has special
as legal
scholars have
application
to legal scholarship,
comprehensively embraced the Corruption Perceptions Index. Legal
scholars use the Corruption Perceptions Index to describe corruption
in countries 320 or in groups of countries, 32 1 although it should be

318.

See Jakob Rigi, Corruption in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, in BETWEEN

MORALITY AND THE LAW: CORRUPTION, ANTHROPOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE SOCIETY

101, 102-14 (Italo Pardo ed., 2004) (describing corruption in Kazakhstan and providing
case studies).
319.
When asked to select among definitions of corruption, 60 percent of
Mongolian respondents chose "acceptance of monetary rewards for services rendered."
Nichols, Siedel & Kasdin, supra note 6, at 232-33. Kazakhstanis were asked the same
question. Nichols, supra note 6, at 955-56. Fourteen percent also chose "acceptance of
monetary rewards for services rendered." Twenty-one percent, however, selected
"infiltration of government by organized crime." Id.
E.g., Ackerman, supra note 95, at 715 n.202 (using the Corruption
320.
Perceptions Index score to describe India); Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and
Inefficiency with Broad Takings Powers and Undercompensation: The Case of
Singaporefrom a Givings Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 18 (2010) (using the
Corruption Perceptions Index to support the statement that "Singapore is one of the
world's least corrupt nations"); Wendy N. Duong, Partnershipswith Monarchs - Two
Case Studies: Case One: Partnershipswith Monarchs in the Search for Oil: Unveiling
and Re-Examining the Patterns of "Third World" Economic Development in the
Petroleum Sector, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1171, 1178 n.15 (2004) (using the
Corruption Perceptions Index to describe Nigeria); Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray,
ExtractingAccountability: The Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and
Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37, 52 n.72 (2008) (using the Corruption
Perceptions Index to describe Equatorial Guinea); C. Raj Kumar, Corruption and
Human Rights: Promoting Transparency in Governance and the FundamentalRight to
Corruption-Free Service in India, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 31, 33 (2003) (using the
Corruption Perceptions Index ranking to describe India); Michael A. Nemeroff, The
Limited Role of Campaign Finance Laws in Reducing Corruption by Elected Public
Officials, 49 HOW. L.J. 687, 714-15 (2006) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index to
describe corruption in the United States); Ijeoma Opara, Nigerian Anti-Corruption
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noted that some scholars use the Corruption Perceptions Index as
only part of a more fulsome description of corruption in a particular
country. 322 Legal scholars use the Corruption Perceptions Index as a
means of or source of data for comparative analysis of countries and
regions.3 23 Legal scholars draw conclusions from changes in time in
Corruption Perceptions Index scores, 3 24 they perform correlative

Initiatives, 6 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 65, 66 (2007) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index
to describe corruption in Nigeria).
321.
E.g., Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice
Implications for International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65 & n.164
(2010) (using Corruption Perceptions Index data to support characterization of various
countries as corrupt); Timur Kuran, The Provisionof Public Goods Under Islamic Law:
Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOCY REV. 841, 884
(2001) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index to describe corruption in North Africa).
This paper uses the Corruption Perceptions Index and other indexes to support the
proposition that corruption is a problem in Southeast Asia. See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
322.
E.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in
Transition:A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 233 (2003) (using the
Corruption Perceptions Index as part of a more elaborate description of corruption in
Russia); James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and
Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125, 150 (2009) (using the Corruption Perception
Index to support analysis of corruption in Kenya); Jonathan D. Greenberg, The
Kremlin's Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the Russian Authoritarian Tradition,
45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 34-35 (2009) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index as
supplement to fulsome description of corruption in Russia); Matthew J. Spence,
American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters:Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials
in U.S. Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1189 (2005) (using the Corruption Perceptions
Index to highlight corruption in Ukraine).
323.
E.g., Giorleny D. Altamirano, The Impact of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 487, 525-28 (2007) (relying
extensively on the Corruption Perceptions Index for comparative data); Sanja Kutnjak
Ivkovic, To Serve and Collect: Measuring Police Corruption, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 593, 612 (2003) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index to compare
corruption among regions); Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94
GEO. L.J. 1725, 1751 & n.137 (2006) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index to
compare levels of corruption within the European Union); David Kopel, Carlisle Moody
& Howard Nemerov, Is There a RelationshipBetween Guns and Freedom? Comparative
Results from Fifty-Nine Nations, 13 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3, 5 (2008) (explaining how
the article will extensively use data from the Corruption Perceptions Index as part of a
comparative analysis of fifty-nine countries); Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not
Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1791 (2008) (focusing on the Corruption
Perceptions Index in comparison of human welfare); Andrew Brady Spalding,
Unwitting Sanctions: UnderstandingAnti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions
Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 375-76 (2010) (using the Corruption
Perceptions Index to compare levels of corruption in industrialized and emerging
economies); Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 19942004, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 24, 27 (2007) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index as a
source of data for comparative analysis of corruption); George H. Norris, Note, Closer to
Justice: TransferringCases from the InternationalCriminal Court, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L.
201, 226 n.149 (2010) (using the Corruption Perceptions Index to compare several
African countries).
324.
E.g., Valeria Merino Dirani, The Role of Civil Society in Promoting
Transparency and Fighting Corruption in Ecuador, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 319, 326
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analyses on scores, 325 and even conduct regression analysis. 326 Legal
scholars have analyzed Corruption Perceptions Index data to find

insights into the relationship between corruption and peaceful
settlement of disputes, 327 compliance with environmental accords, 328
the relationship between judges' pay and corruption, 3 29 and
observation of human rights. 330 In prescriptive writing, legal scholars
propose the Corruptions Perceptions Index as a model for other

(2004) (comparing Corruption Perceptions Index rankings and scores over a period of
years to argue that "the situation in most countries has not improved. In some cases, it
has actually worsened .. "); Kathleen A. Lacey, Barbara Crutchfield George & Clyde
Stoltenberg, Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Certification
Provisions:A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 38 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 433 (2005) (using Corruption Perception Index scores to measure
changes in levels of corruption in the United States over a lengthy interval); Louise D.
Williams, Out of the Gray: Building the Case and the Conditions for Enterprisesto Join
the Formal Economy in Central America, 12 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 329, 341 (2006)
(using changes in Corruption Perceptions Index ranking to describe Costa Rica).
325.
E.g., Thomas W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals,
Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 586 (2003)
(discussing correlative study using Corruption Perceptions Index data); John Norton
Moore, Beyond the DemocraticPeace. Solving the War Puzzle, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 341,
350 (2004) (correlating Corruption Perceptions Index scores with other data); Matt A.
Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of
Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 427
(2009) (referring to empirical research based on the Corruption Perceptions Index).
326.
E.g., Hylton & Khanna, supra note 11, at 110-11 (using a regression
analysis of Corruption Perceptions Index scores: "The results indicate that corruption
is significantly lower where a common law system is in place").
327.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 9, at 394-99 (comparing data from the
Corruption Perceptions Index to other data to determine correlation between
corruption and frequency of peaceful settlement of conflicts).
328.
Benedict Sheehy, InternationalMarine Environment Law: A Case Study in
the Wider CaribbeanRegion, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 464 n.179 (2004) (using
Corruption Perceptions Index scores to evaluate effect of corruption on compliance with
environmental accord).
329.
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A
Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 62 (2009)
(using Corruption Perceptions Index scores to support an argument that the pay of
judges has little to do with levels of corruption).
330.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against
Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 697, 743 (2006) (discussing
correlation between high score on the Corruption Perceptions Index and good
reputations for human rights).
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programs, 3 31 and admonish private sector actors to pay heed to the
332
Index.
Clearly, the Corruption Perceptions Index has become a widelyused tool for legal scholarship. 33 3 Empirical indexes provide legal
scholarship with verifiable insights into corruption, as well as a
source of empirical information for rigorous quantitative treatment of

corruption. 334 It is critical, however, that legal scholars who use
empirical indexes understand the meaning of the data. Similar scores
do not mean that countries experience corruption in the same way;
countries and other localities experience corruption in vastly different
fashions.
Singapore receives a score of 9.3 in the Corruption Perceptions
Index; Malaysia receives a score of 4.4.335 If corruption were a
monolithic phenomenon, if corruption occurred in a linear manner,
then observers could permissibly conclude from these numbers that
Singapore experiences roughly half of the corruption experienced in
Malaysia and that the average individual Singaporean experiences
half as much corruption as does the average individual Malaysian.
One could conclude that if the average Malaysian encounters ten
bribe requests in a week, then the average Singaporean encounters
five; if the average Malaysian purchasing bureaucrat receives a
thousand ringgit per month in bribes, then the average Singaporean
bureaucrat receives two hundred Singaporean dollars. None of these

331.
E.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Developing the MRI (MediationReceptivity Index),
22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 599, 607-11 (2007) (proposing the Corruption
Perceptions Index as a model for a mediation receptivity index); Martin Skladany,
Buying Our Way out of Corruption: Performance-Based Incentive Bonuses for
Developing Country Politicians and Bureaucrats, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 160,
169 (2009) (proposing the Corruption Perceptions Index as a "solid foundation" upon
which to base the evaluation component of an incentive-based program to manage
corruption at local levels).
332.
E.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions:Liability Trend to Watch,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1454 & n.26 (2008) (warning businesses to pay attention to the
Corruption Perceptions Index).
333.
See Jos6 C. Garcia GonzAlez, Rosa 0. GonzAlez Robles, Adolfo Mir Araujo &
Araceli Garcia del Soto, Public Sector Corruption in Mexico: Social Representations
Among the Legal Community of the Federal District, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
231, 235 (2006) ("The non-governmental organization Transparency International (TI)
produces the most comprehensive and recognized Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
in the international sphere."); Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion
Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51, 111 (2009) (describing the
"widely cited Corruption Perceptions Index"); Spalding, supra note 323, at 375 ("The
most commonly cited gauge of public corruption is the Corruption Perception
Index....").
334.
See Royce de R. Barondes, The Limits of Quantitative Legal Analyses:
Chaos in Legal Scholarship and FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 161,
161-62 (1995) (stating that quantitative analysis could add much to legal scholarship
but warning about the lack of rigor within the field).
335.
Corruption PerceptionsIndex 2010 Results, supra note 28.
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conclusions, of course, are true, as conversations with the discussants
336
richly reveal.
A study by Claire Moore Dickerson illustrates the hazards
encountered when legal scholars treat quantitative data as
representative of a unified, linear phenomenon.3 3 7 The study
attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of a cross-border business law
regime in Africa in encouraging foreign investment. 338 Dickerson
recognizes that factors other than the harmonization of laws may
affect investment, and so attempts to factor out those influences in
her analysis. 339 She baldly states that "We can also consider changes
in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as
340
a proxy for measuring the protection of private property."
Discussions in Singapore and Malaysia, however, call this
assumption into question. Discussants in Malaysia expressed far
more experience with corruption than discussants in Singapore, but
that experience generally had to do with bribe requests for
permissions and contracts rather than misappropriation of
property. 341 Discussants in Singapore certainly did not report twice
the property security experienced by discussants from Malaysia, nor
did Malaysian discussants report twice as much concern.
Corruption-the use or misuse of a position of trust or responsibility
for personal gain rather than the intended benefit-can have a
relationship with property security. 34 2 Clearly, discussants in
Malaysia encounter more corruption, experience more corruption on a
raw level than do discussants in Singapore. Corruption, however,
exhibits numerous manifestations and the fact that more or less raw
corruption exists in one location does not suggest the existence of
more or less of a single iteration of corruption. Dickerson's
assumption that quantitative data represents uniform experience
with one manifestation of corruption is erroneous, which renders use
of that data as a proxy for property protection inappropriate.

336.
See supra notes 238-65 and accompanying text (reporting discussants'
experiences with corruption).
337.
Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA
Calls the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17 (2005).
338.
Id. at 65-67.
339.
Id. at 65.
340.
Id. at 66.
341.
Malaysian discussants' general discussions of their experiences with
corruption are reported supra Part IV.B.2.
342.
See Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 861, 880
(2010) (noting the relationship).
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C. CorruptionCan Be Controlled
Some social observers suggest that corruption has always existed
and always will. 343 Their observation is hardly unique to corruption:
crimes have existed as long as states have existed to draft criminal
rules, social ills have probably existed as long as societies, and
predation predates Homo sapiens.344 The observation that corruption
has always existed, however, seems to imply futility in attempts to
control corruption, and that social resources would better be used
345
elsewhere.
Far too often one hears that corruption is an ineluctable part of
the culture in regions such as Southeast Asia, that corruption is
simply the way things are done in such regions, and that corruption
is too embedded to be removed. 346 Corruption, however, was

343.
See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, New Weapons Used in Drive on Corruption,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1984, at B1 (citing Rudolph Giuliani, then U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, and quoting Patrick McGinley, New York City
Investigation Commissioner, as saying, "There will always be corruption, just like
there will always be narcotics"); see Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation,
Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 680
(2000) ("While domestic anti-bribery laws are ubiquitous, the practice of bribery has
obstinately remained."). Professor Salbu does, it should be noted, advocate local
institutional reform. Some commentators, usually not from emerging or developing
countries, argue that transnational efforts to control corruption constitute "moral
imperialism," implying that corruption is culturally accepted in some polities. See, e.g.,
Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16
(2000) (labeling global anticorruption efforts as moral imperialism).
344.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectiveson International Criminal Justice, 50
VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 274 (2010) (discussing criminal codes that go back as far as history);
Jeremiah E. Scott & Curtis W. Marean, Paleolithic Hominin Remains from Eshkaft-e
Gavi (Southern Zagros Mountains, Iran): Description, Affinities, and Evidence for
Butchery, 57 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 248, 248 (2009) (discussing evidence of cannibalism in
early hominids); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime
Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1850 (2005)
(discussing crime in ancient India).
345.
MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT
IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG 4 (2004) ("[N]ot only is corruption control costly,
but the 'pursuit of absolute integrity' is quite dysfunctional, distorting the purpose of
government and its agencies."): Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupation with
Ethics in Government, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 756 (1999) ("[E]thical conduct is not a
free commodity; it comes at a cost. Every call for higher ethical standards diverts
attention from other social problems. Every investigation of a government official
entails expenses, not the least of which is distraction of the accused and others from
the performance of official duties. Every dollar spent on ethics enforcement is money
diverted from other worthy programs."). This line of reasoning would be considered
odd, at best, if applied to other crimes and social ills such as murder, which has also
always existed and which continues to exist despite the expenditure of considerable
resources to control it.
346.
See generally Hess & Dunfee, supra note 76, at 613-15 (discussing and
dismissing the claim that bribery is justified because it is practiced in some
communities).
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ubiquitous in Singapore from the beginning of the colonial settlement
3 47
to the creation of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau.
Singapore is undeniably intertwined with the culture of Southeast
Asia, and yet corruption has been steadily reduced and Singapore
now stands as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.3 48
Moreover, Singapore has done so while creating and maintaining
tremendous amounts of national and personal wealth. 349 Singapore
belies any assertion that corruption cannot be controlled in regions
such as Southeast Asia, or anywhere in the world.
Singapore certainly is not the only polity to have experienced
such a transformation. Just as Singapore, Hong Kong once endured
endemic corruption. 350 Jin-Wook Choi notes that corruption
was present in almost every segment of society and constituted a way of
life of Hong Kong people. Many observers characterize pre-1970s
corruption in Hong Kong as being pathological and prevalent, with
public services such as ambulances or firefighting not readily provided
351
without "tea money" or "water money" payments.

Today, however, "Hong Kong is known as one of the most corruptionfree societies in the world. '352 One important component of Hong
Kong's success has been changing the attitudes held by people in
Hong Kong toward corruption. 353 Interestingly, Lee Kuan Yew also

347.
See QUAH, supranote 158, at 109-14.
348.
Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation
Payments and the InternationalFocus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under
the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 902 n.118 (2011) (noting
Singapore's high ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index).
349.
As of 2010, Singapore has a GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
(ppp) in international dollars of $57,936. This places Singapore ahead of the United
States' GDP per capita (ppp) of $47,199. Malaysia trails behind with a GDP per capita
(ppp) of $14,731. To place things in perspective Cambodia ranks 188th with a GDP per
capita (ppp) of $2,194, Burma ranks two hundred and fifth with a GDP per capita (ppp)
of $1,950. GDP per Capita, PPP (Current International $), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
350.
See QUAH, supra note 158, at 133-35 (describing government-tolerated
protection rackets, virulent police corruption, corruption in the education system, and
rampant corruption in public services and regulation); Hauk & Saez-Marti, supra note
236, at 312 (describing Hong Kong as "a country plagued by corruption for centuries").
351.
Choi, supranote 281, at 200 (citation omitted).
352.
Id.; see Jinhua Cheng, Police Corruption Control in Hong Kong arid New
York City: A Dilemma of Checks and Balances in Combating Corruption, 23 BYU J.
PUB. L. 185, 192 (2009) (discussing the "widely appreciated" success of Hong Kong in
controlling police corruption).
353.
See Marina Kurkchiyan, Judicial Corruption in the Context of Legal
Culture, in TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN

JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 99, 106 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007) (attributing
Hong Kong's "notable" success in controlling corruption to the "promot[ion of] ethical
values against corruption"); Hauk & Saez-Marti, supra note 236, at 312 (using survey
responses from different age groups to demonstrate that efforts to change attitudes
toward corruption succeeded in Hong Kong); Grace 0. M. Lee, A De-CapacitatedState?:
Systemic Constraints on Governance in Hong Kong, in GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
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speaks of attitudes toward corruption, and of the commitment of
leaders that corruption would not be tolerated:
When the [People's Action Party] took office in 1959, we set out to have
a clean administration. We were sickened by the greed, corruption and
We made sure from the day we
decadence of many Asian leaders ....
took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly
accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots as
354
one dollar, without being siphoned off along the way.

Hong Kong and Singapore are not alone. Polities throughout the
world, large and small, have experienced large and small successes in
controlling corruption. 355 Indeed, the United States is one of those
countries, having recovered from rampant corruption in the mid56
1800s.A
Discussions with persons in Singapore and Malaysia suggest
that attitudes toward, and the extent of internalization of, corruption
laws play a consequential role in controlling corruption. Changes in
attitudes toward corruption are well documented at the global
level.3 57 In the conclusion to his seminal work on corruption, Judge
Noonan quite aptly describes the attitudinal change over a century of
time, in which attitudes toward corruption shifted from a moral
perspective to an economic perspective.3 58 In the last twenty years,
the attitudes of scholars, policymakers, and businesspeople toward
corruption have changed.35 9 In conversations with Singaporean

SECTOR REFORM IN ASIA, supra note 5, at 119 (describing the heavy investment in
"promoting a culture of clean government").
354.
LEE KuAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE STORY:
1965-2000, at 157, 159 (2000).
355.
See, e.g., Soonhee Kim, Public Trust in Government in Japan and South
Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter?, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 801, 802 (2010)
(describing successes of Japanese legal reform and civil programs in reaction to a
corruption crisis in national governance); 2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Barbados,
HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/Index/country/Barbados (last visited Dec.
26, 2011) (reporting that Barbados' economic freedom score substantially improved
"due to improvements in its freedom from corruption and monetary freedom scores").
356.
See ALAN LESSOFF, THE NATION AND ITS CITY: POLITICS, "CORRUPTION,"
AND PROGRESS IN WASHINGTON, D.C., 1861-1902 (1994) (describing recovery from
period of rampant corruption); MARK W. SUMMERS, THE PLUNDERING GENERATION:
CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION, 1849-1861 (1987) (describing rampant
corruption in the United States).
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Linking InternationalMarkets and Global Justice,
357.
107 MICH. L. REV. 1039, 1045 (2009) (book review) (describing a "sea change" in
international attitudes and activities regarding corruption).
358.
See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 683-85 (1984). Bribes broke ground in
the study of corruption, particularly among legal scholars. See Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, For God, for Country, or for Me?, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1986) (book
review) (describing Bribes, shortly after its publication, as "a major contribution,
especially to a field as neglected as bribery").
359.
George, Lacey & Birmele, supra note 313, at 515-17 (describing significant
changes in attitudes toward corruption); Robert E. Lutz, On Combating the Culture of
Corruption, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 263, 267 (2004) (describing significant changes in
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discussants today, it is clear that Singaporean attitudes toward
corruption have changed. The societal context in which laws are
implemented displays a degree of plasticity. 360 Corruption, it seems,
can be controlled.

V. CONCLUSION

Law inhabits a central role in reform and development
initiatives throughout the world. 361 In much of the world, however,
corruption vitiates the efficacy of legal structures, rendering them
useless and at times counterproductive. 362 Corruption not only
undermines legal and governance structures, it also stunts growth
and degrades the quality of life. 363 If legal scholars wish to
understand the relationships between law and society, law and
business, and law and government in much of the world, then legal
scholars must understand corruption. 364 Corruption demands
365
theoretical and empirical study by legal scholars.

attitudes toward corruption among transnational actors and recognition "that
corruption is a cancer to viable governments and to a healthy international trading
system"); Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global
Business - The Dawn of a New Era, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 349, 362-66 (2000) (describing
the changes in the attitudes of many constituencies with respect to corruption); Nora
M. Rubin, Comment, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb
Corruption and Bribery in InternationalBusiness Transactions:The Legal Implications
of the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and
Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 257, 262 (1998) (discussing how international
efforts to eliminate corruption in international business reflect a major change from
traditional attitudes of corruption). Barbara George and Kathleen Lacey have written
extensively on global changes in attitudes. See Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen
A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral
Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations:A Pivotal Complement to
Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547 (2000); Barbara
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the
Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation:A CriticalAnalysis of CurrentDomestic amd
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1999).
360.
See Hauk & Saez-Marti, supra note 236, at 332 (stating that education of
the young is a critical element in controlling corruption).
361.
See Eric Brousseau, Yves Schemeil & J~r6me Sgard, Bargaining on Law
and Bureaucracies:A Constitutional Theory of Development, 38 J. COMP. ECON. 253
(2010) (offering theoretical explanation for the central role of law).
362.
Delaney, supra note 65, at 421 (2007) (noting that corruption undermines
the rule of law); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption:Greed, Culture, and the State, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 130 (2010) (noting that corruption undermines rule of law and
law reform); see Brent T. White, Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth: Corruption and
the Case for Juries in Emerging Democracies,43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 308 (2010)
(describing how corruption has undermined rule of law initiatives in Central Asia and
Eastern Europe).
363.
See supra notes 49-112 and accompanying text.
364.
See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND
ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 5 (2006) ("The search for new solutions led to an increasing
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Quantitative study of corruption yields much information and
insight. Qualitative research, however, is equally useful and may
provide insights that quantitative study does not. This paper uses
qualitative methods to study corruption, utilizing the opportunities
presented by the similarities and differences in Singapore and
Malaysia. Discussants in Singapore and Malaysia react differently to
the topic of corruption. This difference likely reveals a difference in
the degree to which each group has internalized corruption laws.
Differences in the degree to which each group has internalized
corruption laws suggests differences in the psychic costs that
members of each group contemplates when considering whether or
not to act corruptly. Theory suggests that members of the group
contemplating higher psychic costs would be less likely to act
corruptly: Singapore, where psychic costs seem to be higher, enjoys
less corruption than Malaysia. Indeed, the observations of
discussants support the notion that actors consider a variety of costs
and benefits when determining whether to violate corruption laws.
Interviews with discussants provide other insights as well.
Discussants experience corruption differently, and corruption
manifests itself in a variety of manners-it is certainly not a unitary
or linear phenomenon. Legal scholars thus must take care when
using quantitative data that they do not place more meaning in that
data than what such data allows. More positively, interviews with
discussants, particularly Singaporean discussants, suggest that
attitudes toward corruption can change. Singapore once suffered
endemic corruption and now experiences almost none. Factual
evidence demonstrates that corruption can be controlled.

focus on how poorly many developing country governments functioned and especially
on widespread inadequacies, even corruption, of public regulatory bodies and of the
legal system.").
365.
See Spahn, supra note 295, at 222-23 (arguing for more research on
corruption by legal scholars).

